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Michael Eugene
THOMPSON
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics:
Robbery
- Kidnapping
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder:
December 10,
1984
Date
of arrest: January 5, 1985
Date of birth: June
30,
1959
Victim profile: Maisie
Carlene Gray, 57 (convenience store clerk)
Method of murder:
Shooting (.22 caliber pistol)
Location: Etowah County, Alabama, USA
Status:
Executed
by lethal injection in Alabama on March 13,
2003
Summary:
Maisie Carlene Gray, age 57, had been working at the Attalla
convenience store about three weeks and was working alone on
December 10, 1984 when Thompson, carrying a .22 caliber pistol,
forced her to empty the cash register.
Thompson then forced Gray at gunpoint into the trunk of his car.
After driving around for some time, Thompson took her to a well and
forced her into it, shooting into the well several times, until he
ran out of ammunition.
He then drove to his girlfriend's home, picked up more bullets, and
returned with her to the well. While his girlfriend, Shirley
Franklin held a homemade torch, Thompson fired seven or eight more
shots into the well to make sure Gray was dead.
His girlfriend's husband later called the police and her admissions
led to the well and to Thompson's arrest. Thompson later gave
complete confessions to police.
At trial, Thompson testified that police had coerced him to confess
and that Franklin killed the clerk. The jury did buy the story.
Citations: Thompson v. State, 503 So.2d 871 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (Direct
Appeal). Ex parte Thompson, 503 So.2d 887 (Ala.1987). Thompson v. State, 581 So.2d 1216 ( Ala.Crim.App.1991). (Post
Conviction). Thompson v. Haley, ___ F.3rd ___ (11th Cir. 2001). (Habeas)
ATMORE, Ala. (AP) -- Michael Eugene Thompson was
executed by lethal injection Thursday for the 1984 murder of an
Attalla store clerk who was abducted, forced into a well and shot to
death.
Thompson, 43, became the second Alabama inmate executed by
lethal injection after the U.S. Supreme Court turned back his
attorney's petition claiming Gov. Bob Riley failed to hold a proper
clemency hearing.
Thompson was pronounced dead at 7 p.m., an hour
after his execution was scheduled. Prisons spokesman Brian Corbett
said the procedure didn't begin until 6:37 p.m. because doctors
couldn't find a vein where they could insert the IV into Thompson's
arm.
Officials at Holman Prison near Atmore also had to wait for
word that the U.S. Supreme Court had denied Thompson's petition for
a stay. Thompson was convicted in the abduction and shooting death
of Maisie Carlene Gray, 57, who had been working at the Attalla
convenience store about three weeks when she was robbed and forced
into a car trunk on Dec. 10, 1984.
He made no final statement, but mouthed the words
"I love you" to a friend, Mary Ann Gardner. Gardner, a death penalty
opponent from Roswell, Ga., had asked Gov. Bob Riley to grant
clemency to Thompson.
None of Thompson's family attended the
execution, though he met with about 15 visitors Thursday, including
his mother, three brothers and a spiritual adviser. He was served a
last meal of fried catfish, potato logs, cole slaw, hush puppies,
salad and water at about 1:15 p.m. and appeared in good spirits,
Corbett said.
Evelyn Elliott, Gray's daughter, said she was
disappointed that Thompson showed no remorse toward her or her two
brothers who watched him die. "He did not look in our direction or
offer any apology," Elliott said. "It was horrible ... but if anyone
deserved to die, it was him."
Attorneys for Thompson had skipped a clemency
hearing with Riley on Tuesday, saying the governor made comments
over the weekend that showed he had already made up his mind the
execution should take place.
Thompson's attorneys chose instead to
appeal to the state Supreme Court, which denied their request for a
stay and an order that a clemency hearing be provided before an
impartial person. In earlier rounds of appeal, Thompson's attorneys
had argued their client was provided inadequate counsel during trial,
including that his lawyers assumed Thompson was guilty, said
attorney Marjorie Smith.
Those arguments were rejected in federal
appeals court. "If you're defending somebody you don't start out by
saying `Yeah, he did this,"' she said.
According to court records, Thompson forced the
store clerk into his car trunk and drove to Blount County, where he
made her get into a well and then shot into the well until he ran
out of ammunition. Then he drove to pick up his girlfriend, obtained
more ammunition, and fired seven or eight more shots into the well
to make sure Gray was dead, according to court records.
Elliott, of Attalla, said she and her family are
still unsure what prompted the robbery that resulted in her mother's
murder. She has said that Thompson has claimed he wanted money to
buy Christmas presents, but the family questions that.
ProDeathPenalty.com
The Alabama Supreme Court set a March 13
execution date for Michael Eugene Thompson, who was convicted of the
robbery, kidnapping and murder of a convenience store clerk in
Attalla more than 18 years ago.
The state Supreme Court set the
execution date Tuesday at the request of the attorney general's
office after the U.S. Supreme Court turned back appeals from
Thompson. Thompson's attorney, Mark Gombiner of New York, said he
was reviewing his options and had not decided what approach to take
in trying to halt the execution.
The victim, Maisie Carlene Gray, was working
alone at the Majik Mart convenience store in Attalla on the night of
Dec. 10, 1984. Thompson, carrying a .22 caliber pistol, forced
Maisie to empty the cash register and then forced her into his car
and left the area. After driving around for some time, Thompson took
Maisie to a well and forced her into it, shooting into the well
several times, until he ran out of ammunition.
Then he drove to his
girlfriend's home, picked up more bullets, and returned with her to
the well. While his girlfriend, Shirley Franklin held a homemade
torch, Thompson fired seven or eight more shots into the well to
make sure Maisie Gray was dead. The next day Thompson took the
pistol, which he and Shirley had cleaned, and threw it into another
well.
On January 5, 1985, law enforcement authorities
received a call from Shirley Franklin's husband, reporting that he
knew where the victim of the Majik Mart robbery was and who had
taken her. When the officers arrived at the man's home, Shirley
Franklin told the officers that Thompson had killed Maisie and where
the victim's body was located.
The police found the body at the well,
obtained a statement from Shirley Franklin, and arrested Thompson
the same day. At the time of arrest, Thompson refused to sign a
waiver of his Miranda rights. However, on the following day, after a
visit from Shirley Franklin, he signed a waiver of his rights and
gave a taped confession in which he admitted to the robbery,
kidnapping and murder. Two days later, Thompson was re-interrogated
and again admitted his guilt and gave a similar account of the crime.
Thompson was convicted of capital murder on May
10, 1985, and his jury unanimously recommended a death sentence,
which the trial judge imposed. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to
review Thompson's conviction in 1987.
He filed another appeal,
claiming he had an ineffective attorney at trial, but the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to review that issue in 1992. The U.S.
Supreme Court turned back another appeal in June 2002. The appeal
contended that investigators forced Thompson into confessing to the
crime because they promised not to prosecute his girlfriend for
capital murder if he talked, Gombiner said. Alabama's death penalty
law will allow Thompson to choose whether he wants to die by lethal
injection or in the electric chair at Holman Prison in Atmore.
UPDATE: After the execution, Evelyn Elliott,
Gray's daughter, said she was disappointed that Thompson showed no
remorse toward her or her two brothers who watched him die. "He did
not look in our direction or offer any apology," Elliott said. "It
was horrible ... but if anyone deserved to die, it was him."
Alabama Executes Killer of Convenience Store
Clerk
By Robert Anthony Phillips -
TheDeathPenalty.com
March 13, 2003
ATMORE, AL - A man who robbed and kidnapped a
convenience store clerk, forced her down a well and then shot her to
death from above was executed by lethal injection at Holman
Correctional Facility Thursday night.
Michael Eugene Thompson, 43,
became only the second condemned prisoner to die by lethal injection
in Alabama. He also became the first condemned inmate executed in
Alabama in 2003. Brian Corbett, a spokesman for the Alabama
Department of Corrections, said Thompson had no last words, replying,
"No, sir," when asked.
Trouble Finding Useable Vein
He said the execution procedure was delayed
because medical technicians had a difficult time finding a useable
vein in Thompson to insert the intravenous needle. The execution
procedure began at 6:37 p.m. with the reading of the death warrant,
Corbett said. Thompson was pronounced dead at 7 p.m. The execution
occurred after the U.S. Supreme Court had denied Thompson's final
appeal
No Clemency Plea
Corbett said that Thompson had been held in
isolation in a cell next to the death chamber since Tuesday,
spending his last days visiting with family and friends. Corbett
said the condemned man was in "good spirits" while visiting with his
mother, brothers, uncles and his spiritual advisor. Thompson’s
lawyers had decided not to appeal for clemency after Gov. Bob Riley
stated several days ago that he would not intervene to stop the
execution.
This led to the lawyers' decision to skip the planned
clemency hearing - to be conducted by one of Riley’s aides - and
filing an appeal with the Alabama Supreme Court. The appeal claimed
Thompson was denied a fair chance at clemency by Riley’s comments.
The Alabama high court rejected the appeal. Under Alabama law, a
governor can stop an execution by granting clemency
Went Back To Get More Bullets
The robbery and murder occurred on Dec. 10, 1984
at a convenience store in Attala. Maisie Carleen Gray, 57, was
working at the store only three weeks when Johnson robbed the store,
taking Thompson and forcing her in the trunk of his car. Thompson
then drove her to an area with the well, forced Gray down into it
and repeatedly fired bullets down at her. In a bizarre aspect of the
crime, Thompson then went to the home of his girlfriend, , Shirley
Franklin, to get more bullets and returned with her. As Franklin
held a torch for light, Thompson fired more bullets into the well,
prosecutors said.
Changed Story
After confessing on video to the kidnapping and
murder of Gray, Thompson later changed his story at trial to say
that it was actually his girlfriend, Franklin, who shot the victim.
About a month after the murder, Franklin had been arrested by police
after her husband told them where the victim’s body was hidden.
Shirley Franklin gave police a statement - and later testified in
court - that it was Thompson who shot the clerk. However, Franklin
admitted that she had returned to the well with Thompson and held a
torch for light as Thompson fired more bullets into Gray to make
sure she was dead. Thompson had contended during his appeals that he
was coerced into giving police the confession because they had told
him that Franklin would get the electric chair if he didn’t admit to
the murder, but would be freed if he admitted killing the store
clerk.
Bad Girlfriend
Franklin had a history of armed robbery, having
spend eight years in an Indiana prison, where she had escaped three
times. At trial, Thompson was portrayed by his lawyers as a man
manipulated by Franklin, who was older, with the use of drugs and
alcohol. They say Thompson drank a case of beer and a fifth of
whisky a day and took pain killers and Valium. They also said
Thompson had a guilt complex over the fact that his father was
murdered when he was 17. Thompson’s father was killed in a dispute
with a man over money owned his son.
National Coalition to Abolish
the Death Penalty
Michael Thompson (AL) - March 13, 2003 - 12:00 AM
CST, 1:00 AM EST
The state of Alabama is scheduled to execute
Michael Thompson March 13 for the 1984 murder of Maisie Carlene Gray.
Thompson, a white man, allegedly robbed the Majik Mart in Blount
County on the evening of Dec. 10, 1984, and kidnapped Gray, the lone
employee. According to the state, he then threw her down a well and
shot her, only to return to the well later with his girlfriend,
Shirley Franklin, and more bullets to make sure Gray was dead.
Thompson initially admitted to committing the
crime, but later said police investigators coerced his confession by
threatening and questioning him for 24 consecutive hours. Such
interrogations are unconstitutional, and have been the basis for
numerous exonerations and pardons of death row inmates in the United
States over the past decade.
Over the past 18 years, Thompson has filed a wide
range of appeals, many of which were related to his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. During the guilt/innocence phase of the
trial, his defense lawyers essentially forfeited during opening
statements, agreeing with the prosecution that Thompson had, in fact,
committed the Gray murder. Although he admits to being an accessory
after the fact, he has continuously denied playing a role in the
actual killing.
Johnson’s ineffective counsel argument is
extremely compelling. His defense lawyers presented very little
mitigating evidence, and never even contacted several key potential
witnesses – including his mother, his uncle, and his pastor.
At the state hearing to re-evaluate the death
sentence years later, these witnesses finally offered some
background information on Thompson’s tragic and traumatic
upbringing. According to this mother, he suffered serious physical
abuse from his father as a child, and witnessed his grandfather
shoot his father in the shoulder to protect his mother. At age 17,
Thompson got in a payment dispute at work; when his father
confronted the employer, he died of a gunshot wound. This event
occurred as Thompson and his father were just beginning to heal the
wounds that had traumatized his entire childhood and adolescence.
Thompson’s grandmother blamed him for his
father’s death, and he began drinking and using drugs more heavily
to deal with the guilt (although his substance abuse problems began
at age 10, when his father began providing him with liquor and
drugs). His pastor, Rev. Jerry Fleming, also attested to Thompson’s
intensified struggles with substance abuse after his father’s death,
and said as a teenager Thompson he had demonstrated a deep concern
for others’ well being, as well as a desire to quit using drugs.
Unfortunately for Thompson, his defense lawyers did not ask any of
these witnesses to testify during his trial, and simply skipped over
this mountain of mitigating evidence.
The cycle of violence that has defined Thompson’s
life, as well as his socio-economic and educational background (he
dropped out of school in eighth grade), is sadly the standard
personal history of death row inmates in the United States. The
application of capital punishment continues to discriminate against
people with limited resources, and Thompson now finds himself
dangerously close to execution as a result of the systemic
inequalities in the death penalty process. Please write Gov. Bob
Riley and the state of Alabama and request clemency for Michael
Thompson.
Family Feels No Pain for Inmate Executed for
Their Mother's Murder
By Dave Bryan - Alabama Times Daily
AP - March 14, 2003
James Rodgers saw no reason to take pity on
Michael Eugene Thompson, the man put to death Thursday night for
abducting Rodgers' mother from the convenience store where she
worked, forcing her into a well and shooting her to death more than
18 years ago. "I don't feel sorry for him," Rodgers said after the
execution at Holman Prison near Atmore. "It was his actions that
brought all this about." Added Rodgers' sister, Evelyn Elliott of
Attalla, "He died a very painless death. I wish my mother had a
chance to feel no pain."
Thompson, 43, became the second Alabama inmate
executed by lethal injection after the U.S. Supreme Court turned
back his attorney's petition claiming Gov. Bob Riley failed to hold
a proper clemency hearing. He was convicted in the abduction and
shooting death of Maisie Carlene Gray, 57, who had been working at
the Attalla convenience store about three weeks when she was robbed
and forced into a car trunk on Dec. 10, 1984.
Thompson was pronounced dead at 7 p.m., an hour
after his execution was scheduled. The procedure didn't begin until
6:37 p.m. because doctors couldn't find a vein where they could
insert the IV into his arm, prisons spokesman Brian Corbett said. He
made no final statement, but mouthed the words "I love you" to a
friend, Mary Ann Gardner. Gardner, a death penalty opponent from
Roswell, Ga., had asked Riley to grant clemency to Thompson.
None of
Thompson's family attended the execution, though he met with about
15 visitors Thursday, including his mother, three brothers and a
spiritual adviser. He was served a last meal of fried catfish,
potato logs, cole slaw, hush puppies, salad and water at about 1:15
p.m. and appeared in good spirits, Corbett said.
Elliott said she was disappointed that Thompson
showed no remorse toward her or her two brothers who watched him
die. "He did not look in our direction or offer any apology,"
Elliott said. "It was horrible ... but if anyone deserved to die, it
was him."
Attorneys for Thompson had skipped a clemency
hearing with Riley on Tuesday, saying the governor made comments
over the weekend that showed he had already made up his mind the
execution should take place. Thompson's attorneys chose instead to
appeal to the state Supreme Court, which denied their request for a
stay and an order that a clemency hearing be provided before an
impartial person. In earlier rounds of appeal, Thompson's attorneys
had argued their client was provided inadequate counsel during trial,
including that his lawyers assumed Thompson was guilty, said
attorney Marjorie Smith. Those arguments were rejected in federal
appeals court. "If you're defending somebody you don't start out by
saying `Yeah, he did this,'" she said.
According to court records, Thompson forced the
store clerk into his car trunk and drove to Blount County, where he
made her get into a well and then shot into the well until he ran
out of ammunition. Then he drove to pick up his girlfriend, obtained
more ammunition, and fired seven or eight more shots into the well
to make sure Gray was dead, according to court records.
Elliott said she and her family are still unsure
what prompted the robbery that resulted in her mother's murder. She
has said that Thompson has claimed he wanted money to buy Christmas
presents, but the family questions that.
Canadian Coalition to Abolish
the Death Penalty
(Thompson Homepage)
Michael Thompson - Alabama's Death Row
Dear Friends:
My name is Michael Thompson. I'm a forty year old
white male, and a prisoner on Alabama's death row. I was arrested,
convicted, and sentenced to death for a crime I did not commit. I
was just twenty-five years of age when I was arrested on January 5,
1985, over fifteen years ago.
While the details of the events are very
complicated and have never been allowed to be told, essentially when
I was arrested for the crime the police "tricked" me by telling me
that my live-in girl was also under arrest, charged with the crime,
and would be executed unless I gave a "confession" that I committed
the crime. Out of determination to obtain a confession the police
engaged in these "threats" against her life and "promises" to
release her in exchange for the confession. She was brought in to
see me, wearing handcuffs, weeping, professing her love for me, and
begging me to "save her life", even though she was never under
arrest, and was acting as an agent for the police to help force a
false confession from me.
Prior to my arrest I had a record that consisted
of some fifteen traffic violations that occurred in three separate
traffic stops. No felony convictions. My live-in girlfriend was
eleven years my senior, twice convicted of armed robbery, spent
eight years in an Indiana State Prison, escaping prison three times,
and was wanted for armed robbery as she conspired with the police to
frame me for the crime in question. The crime was a month old and
the police had no leads until she came forward and led them to the
victim's body, telling them that I committed the crime.
The police
were desperate to solve the crime, and acting on her word they
rushed to arrest me, and to force a confession from me, despite my
invoking my Constitutional Rights to remain silent, to receive
counsel, and a telephone call. My invocation of mv rights was
recorded onto the Miranda waiver sheet, witnessed by a second
investigator and filed.
Then the police very aggressively proceeded
to interrogate me in repeated waves for over twenty-four hours in
direct violation of my Constitutional Rights. When I continued to
invoke my right, refusing to talk to the police, requesting an
attorney and a telephone call, the police became very frustrated and
designed the plan to use Promises, Threats, and Trickery that
involved my live-in girlfriend. Having been held for over twenty-four
hours "incommunicado" ,put through waves of brutal interrogations, I
finally agreed to say whatever they desired in exchange for her
release, so that she could retain counsel for me as she promised.
The courts consider a "confession" the most
damning evidence possible against a defendant. so the investigators
will stoop to any level necessary to obtain a confession. They also
cover up evidence that will jeopardize the validity of the
confession, such as they did in my case when they failed to produce
the waiver of rights sheet that recorded my refusal to waive my
rights. in defiance of the court's order that all evidence both for
and against be produced. However, the court itself helped in the
prosecution's illegal actions by denying me a pre-trial suppression
hearing in which to challenge the voluntariness of the coufession.
The court, midway through the trial, simply allowed the confession
into evidence under a "collateral benefit" doctrine that the Supreme
Court had rejected some years prior.
Court appointed defense attorneys never attempted
to even mount a defense since the prosecution would present the
confession. They simply pled me guilty to capital murder in their
opening statement, begging the jury to spare my life.
The State's key witness, my ex-girifriend, took
the stand to testiiy against me. During recess the victim of her
armed robbery made a positive identification that she was indeed the
woman who had put a gun to his head and threatened to "blow his
brains out ". The entire court knew this. However, she was not
arrested for the crime, because it would have destroyed her
testimony as the State's key witness. Furthermore, she was paid some
$11,000 in reward money for her services, and after the trial was
able to erase her entire life long record. Professional
investigation companies were unable to find that she ever existed.
It took me many years of worthless, wasted
appeals in the State appeals courts before I was allowed to appeal
to the Federal Courts. On November 13, 1997, I attended a Federal
District Court hearing on the voluntariness of the confession...my
first opportunity to really challenge the confession, and the
Federal Judge was so moved by the evidence that he issued a verbal
ruling that day, ruling the confession "Involuntary" i.e., a product
of promises, threats, and trickery, and illegally obtained. I was
wrongfully convicted. Howeven even though the Federal Judge ruled
the confession "involuntary", two years and three months later (as
of March 1, 2000), I still sit on death row as if nothing happened.
Having ruled that I was wrongfully convicted, you would think thai
the Judge would be eager to correct the injustice that has been
done.
My Pro Bono attorneys have taken a "do nothing"
position, and they will not respond to my letters of concern,
leaving me with no legal assistance nor advice. I should be a free
man today, but due to the Judge's negligence and passive attorneys I
still sit on death row condemned to die. How does a United States
Federal Court Judge rule verbally that a man was wrongfully,
convicted by the use of an illegal, involuntary confession, yet
still fail to correct the wrong that was done twenty-seven months
later?
I've come to realize that I'm in dire need of
competent, diligent, aggressive attorneys who will press for resolve.
Having no means in which to hire competent attorneys who will pursue
my best interests, I am left sitting on death row, wrongfully
convicted, ruled so by a Federal Court Judge, yet still helplessly
condemned to death! This wrongful conviction has stolen over fifteen
years of my life, and I am no closer to my freedom than I was
fifteen years ago, despite the Federal Court's ruling that I was in
fact wrongfully convicted by use of an illegal, involuntary
confession, a product of promises, threats, and trickery. Where's MY
justice? I'm a United States citizen, and I'm entitled to the
protections guaranteed under the Constitution.
The very same investigators who did this to me
have caused that county to have to pay millions of dollars in law
suits for the same illegal actions used against other innocent men
in other cases. Their record speaks for itself Terrorism is their
normal procedure for solving cases, and what they do is no different
than putting a gun to the head of a loved one and demanding false
confessions in exchange fortheir life,
It's become blatantly obvious to me that national
exposure is required in order to force the wheels of justice along,
and hopefully help me to obtain competent, aggressive legal
assistance who will pursue my ultimate freedom from this wrongful
conviction. I would deeply appreciate any and all support that is
offered on my behalf. "Remember them that are in bonds. as though
bound with them; and them which suffer adversity, as being
yourselves also in the body." (Hebrews 13:3)
Thank you, Michael Thompson.
Michael Thompson
Z-454 5-21
100 Warrior Lane
Bessemer, Alabama 35023 - 7299
In the United States Court of
Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 00-15572
MICHAEL EUGENE THOMPSON,
Petitioner-Appellant, versus
MICHAEL W. HALEY, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of
Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
D.C. Docket No. 94-C-2343-S
July 3, 2001
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
Before DUBINA, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Michael Eugene Thompson appeals from the district
court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 following his conviction for capital murder and
the imposition of the death penalty. On appeal, Thompson seeks
reversal of the district court's denial of federal habeas relief
based on two claims:
(1) His conviction and sentence were based upon a
confession which was unlawfully obtained and admitted at trial in
violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
(2) He was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty
phases of trial.
BACKGROUND
On the night of December 10, 1984, Thompson
robbed the Majik Mart in Attalla, Alabama. Maisie Gray was the only
person working at the store that night. Thompson, carrying a .22
caliber pistol, forced Gray to empty the cash register and then
forced her into his car and left the area. After driving around for
some time, Thompson took Gray to a well and forced her into it,
thereafter shooting into the well several times.
Thompson then drove
to the home of Shirley Franklin with whom he was living. He told
Shirley Franklin what had happened, picked up some more bullets and
returned to the well with Franklin. While Franklin held a homemade
torch, Thompson shot into the well seven or eight more times. The
next day Thompson took the pistol, which he and Shirley had cleaned,
and threw it into another well.
On January 5, 1985, law enforcement authorities
received a call from Gary Franklin, Shirley Franklin's husband,
reporting that he knew where the victim of the Majik Mart robbery
was and who had taken her. When the officers arrived at Gary
Franklin's home, Shirley Franklin told the officers that Thompson
had killed Gray and where the victim's body was located. The police
found the body at the well, obtained a statement from Shirley
Franklin, and arrested Thompson the same day.
At the time of arrest, Thompson refused to sign a
waiver of his Miranda rights. However, on the following day, after a
visit from Shirley Franklin, he signed a waiver of his rights and
gave a taped confession in which he admitted to the robbery,
kidnaping and murder. Two days later, Thompson was re-interrogated
and again admitted his guilt and gave a similar account of the
crime.
After a jury trial, Thompson was convicted of
capital murder in violation of Section 13A-5-40(a)(1) and (2) of the
Code of Alabama (1975), and the jury recommended the death penalty.
Following a separate sentencing hearing, the trial judge followed
the jury's recommendation and sentenced Thompson to death. The
Alabama Criminal Court of Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed. Thompson v. State, 503 So.2d 871 (Ala.Crim.App.1986); Ex
parte Thompson, 503 So.2d 887 (Ala.1987).
Thompson filed a petition for post-conviction
relief in state court and after a full evidentiary hearing pursuant
to Rule 20 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, the state
trial court denied relief and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed. Thompson v. State, 581 So.2d 1216 ( Ala.Crim.App.1991).
Thompson next filed for federal habeas. The
district court held an evidentiary hearing on his involuntary
confession claim and made oral factual findings, but it later ruled
that the evidentiary hearing was improperly granted and that it
erred in making its findings of fact and denied relief on all
claims. Thompson appeals.
Standard of Review
Thompson's habeas corpus petition was filed
before April 24, 1996; therefore, the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) does not govern our analysis. (1) Under
pre-AEDPA standards, the state court's factual determinations that
are reasonably based on the record are presumptively correct. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). We review state court determinations of law de
novo. Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 861 (11th Cir.1999). We
review the district court's findings of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard and the district court's legal conclusions de
novo. Remeta v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 513, 516 (1996).
Discussion I. Whether Thompson's confession was
admitted in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
We first address Thompson's argument that he is
entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on the claim that his
confessions were unlawfully obtained and admitted at trial in
violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically,
Thompson asserts that his confession was coerced by state law
enforcement's false representation that Shirley Franklin would be
left to bear the responsibility for the crime alone and face the
electric chair if Thompson did not confess.
According to Thompson's testimony at the
Jackson-Denno hearing (2) on his motion to suppress the confession,
he was interrogated by Detective A.G. Lang on the day he was
arrested for approximately one hour. Lang told Thompson that he
could place Shirley Franklin at the well, that Franklin was in a
cell downstairs in the jail, and that she would be tried and
sentenced to the electric chair along with him, but that he would
let her go if Thompson made a statement.
Thompson then asked to talk
with Franklin, and Franklin was immediately brought in, in
handcuffs, to speak with Thompson. Thompson told her that he was
going to confess because Lang had promised to release her if he did
so. Franklin responded that she loved him. After meeting with
Franklin, Thompson told Lang that he was ready to confess. Lang then
notified Sheriff McDowell. When McDowell arrived, he gave Thompson a
waiver of rights form, which Thompson signed, and then proceeded to
take his tape-recorded confession.
In rebuttal, the state called Sheriff McDowell.
McDowell testifed that, before Thompson gave his confession,
Thompson had asked to speak with both Lang and Franklin. After he
had spoken with Lang and Franklin, and after McDowell had informed
Thompson of his Miranda rights, Thompson gave his confession.
McDowell stated that at no time in his presence were any promises,
threats, or coercion made to Thompson, and that no one told Thompson
that Franklin would be prosecuted for capital murder unless Thompson
confessed.
On appeal, Thompson argues that because the state
court misapplied governing law and failed to make any factual
findings, he was entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing to
resolve the factual dispute as to the circumstances under which
Thompson gave his confession. We agree that the state trial court
made no findings of fact after the Jackson-Denno hearing regarding
Thompson's claim of coercion and that the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals likewise made no factual findings. (3) However, we conclude,
as a matter of law, that Thompson's version of events, even if true,
would not make his statement involuntary, and therefore he is not
entitled to relief on this claim.
Under certain circumstances, the Supreme Court
has found that police deception invalidates an accused's waiver of
the Fifth Amendment privilege. (4) See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963) (misrepresentation
by police officers that a suspect would be deprived of state
financial aid for her dependent child if she failed to cooperate
with authorities rendered the subsequent confession involuntary);
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961)
(confession involuntary where defendant confessed when police chief
pretended that if defendant did not confess the defendant's ailing
wife would be arrested).
In this case, unlike in Lynumn and Rogers,
Thompson's girlfriend, Shirley Franklin, had voluntarily implicated
herself in the murder prior to Thompson's arrest. Although the
Supreme Court has not addressed police promises for leniency to a
possible co-defendant, this Court has done so in the context of
negotiating a guilty plea. See Martin v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1244,
1247-48 (11th Cir.1985).
While significant differences exist between
a defendant's plea in open court and a custodial interrogation, the
principles addressed by this Court in determining what constitutes
police overreaching appear to us equally applicable in this context.
In Martin, a habeas petitioner argued that his confession and guilty
plea were involuntary because they were prompted by police threats
to bring charges against his young pregnant wife.
This Court found
that while probable cause existed at the time of Martin's plea
hearing to file criminal charges against Martin's wife, it was
unclear from the record on appeal whether the police had probable
cause at the time the threat was actually made. We held that whether
a threat to prosecute a third party was coercive depends upon
whether the state had probable cause to believe that the third party
had committed a crime at the time that the threat was made and
remanded for this determination. Id. at 1248-49. See also United
States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir.1979) (remanding for a
hearing on whether threats to prosecute defendant's wife were based
on probable cause and explaining that "absent probable cause to
believe that the third person has committed a crime, offering 'concessions'
as to him or her constitutes a species of fraud.").
In this case,
Shirley Franklin's own statement established her participation in
the crime. She acknowledged that she accompanied Thompson back to
the crime scene and held a torch while he again shot into the well,
assisted him in cleaning the murder weapon, and then accompanied him
to dispose of it. Under the circumstances, the police had probable
cause to arrest her at the time A.G. Lang allegedly told Thompson
that she could have faced responsibility for the crime. Under the
rationale of Martin, the alleged statement regarding Shirley
Franklin did not constitute coercion. Accordingly, we reject
Thompson's argument that he was coerced into confessing and, thus,
find no error in the admission of the confession.
II. Whether Thompson was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
We now turn to Thompson's argument that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt/innocence
and sentencing phases of his trial. Ineffectiveness of counsel is a
mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review. Meeks v.
Moore, 216 F.3d 951, 959 (11th Cir.2000). State court findings of
historical facts made in the course of evaluating an ineffectiveness
claim are subject to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d). Similarly, federal district court findings are deemed
correct under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) unless clearly erroneous. See Bush
v. Singletary, 988 F.2d 1082, 1089 (11th Cir.1993).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must
meet the familiar two-prong test set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Second, the defendant must show that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104
S.Ct. 2052. Thompson argues that counsel's performance during trial
fell below the standard of professional conduct required by
Strickland because:
(1) during the opening statement counsel
acknowledged that Thompson had robbed Gray, kidnaped her, pushed her
down the well, and stood by while Franklin shot her;
(2) in attempting to impeach Shirley Franklin
through testimony concerning her lifestyle, her past criminal acts,
and her conduct reflecting her remorselessness after the murder,
defense counsel implicated Thompson in the same lifestyle and
conduct;
(3) counsel abandoned a viable intoxication
defense which would have permitted the jury to convict of a lesser
included offense; failed to present their own psychiatric expert's
report and failed to argue that Thompson's alcohol and drug use on
the night of the murder left him with diminished capacity;
(4) counsel's pretrial investigation into
mitigation evidence and their preparation for the sentencing phase
was deficient, and as a result, counsel failed to present available
mitigation witnesses and failed to elicit mitigating testimony from
Thompson's mother; and
(5) counsel dehumanized Thompson and distanced
themselves from him in the closing argument of the guilt/innocence
phase of trial by conceding to the jury that Thompson's lifestyle
was alien to most people.
A. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
pertaining to the conviction
Giving the state court findings of fact the
presumption of correctness, we find no error in the district court's
conclusion that Thompson has not established that counsel's
performance at the guilt/innocence phase of trial was so
unreasonable and prejudicial as to undermine our confidence in the
outcome of his conviction.
Thompson claims first that it was
ineffective and prejudicial for counsel to concede in opening
statement that Thompson had robbed and kidnaped Gray and pushed her
down the well, even though Counsel also asserted that it was
Franklin and not Thompson who had shot her. We find that Counsel's
concession of Thompson's participation in the crime was not
unreasonable in light of the overwhelming evidence that Counsel knew
was going to be presented against Thompson during the trial.
First,
in every statement Thompson gave to the police and to his lawyers,
Thompson had confessed to the robbery and kidnaping. Even when he
changed his story and placed the blame for the shooting on Shirley
Franklin, he still admitted that he had robbed and kidnaped Gray.
His original two confessions indicated that he had already placed
Gray in the well and emptied his gun into it before he returned home
to obtain more bullets and, accompanied by Shirley, returned and
fired additional shots into the well.
Later, he told his lawyers and
testified at trial that, after he had robbed and abducted Gray, he
was panicked and drunk and, not knowing what to do, told Gray to get
in the trunk of the car and drove to Franklin's home. After telling
Franklin what had happened, they then drove to the well. In fact,
Thompson testified at trial that he had told Franklin that they
should put Gray in the well and then flee the country and call to
tell someone where Gray was. When Thompson refused to shoot Gray
after Franklin's insistence that he do so, Thompson said Franklin
called him chicken, took the gun and shot into the well.
Counsel knew that the foregoing would be
Thompson's testimony at trial. They also knew that Shirley Franklin
would testify that it was Thompson who shot Gray in the well, and
that she had arrived at the well with Thompson after the fact. They
further understood that Thompson's confession after his arrest,
corroborating Franklin's version of events, would also be introduced
at trial.
The record from the state habeas hearing supports the fact
that counsel made a strategic decision to present the case as
Thompson presented it to them: Thompson was culpable for the robbery
and abduction, but he had no intent to murder Ms. Gray and did not
participate in the murder. Counsel also testified at the hearing
that they conceded Thompson's limited participation to gain
credibility for Thompson's testimony that it was Franklin that
suggested and carried out the killing. Under these circumstances, we
do not find that Thompson has borne his burden of proving
ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.
Thompson next argues that it was ineffective and
prejudicial to elicit testimony which implicated Thompson in
Franklin's lifestyle, her past criminal acts and conduct reflecting
her remorselessness after the murder. Defense counsel testified at
the state post-conviction hearing that their strategy at trial was "one
of diminished capacity, limited participation, addiction to drugs
and alcohol, and remorse."
Faced with Franklin's testimony and
Thompson's own confession as well as his later story that it was
Franklin who had ordered and then carried out the murder, Counsel's
course of action was to present a picture of Franklin as an older
woman who controlled and manipulated Thompson with drugs and alcohol
and was successful in getting him to do her bidding, not only at the
well, but in the past as well.
Trial counsel sought to discredit
Franklin's conflicting testimony by introducing her prior conviction
for armed robbery, her record of escapes, the testimony of Connie
Pope that Franklin admitted to robbing older men by taking them to
motels and knocking them unconscious, as well as an armed robbery of
a pizza restaurant in Boaz, Alabama, and the testimony of Thompson
that several months prior to the murder he had robbed a store with
Franklin and that Franklin had held a gun on the storekeeper.
Thompson argues that it would have been
sufficient to impeach Franklin with only the evidence of her prior
convictions and escapes and other conduct in which Thompson did not
participate. However, counsel was attempting to explain Franklin's
domination of Thompson to support his story that it was Franklin who
had committed the murder and so elicited testimony regarding
Franklin's influence on him and evidence of his actions at her
direction on prior occasions.
Counsel's strategy to paint Franklin
as manipulating Thompson and as the more evil of the two is not
beyond the scope of professional representation required by the
Constitution when considered in light of what was available as a
defense under the circumstances here.
Thompson next argues that Counsel fell below the
standard for constitutionally effective counsel by abandoning a
viable intoxication defense which would have permitted the jury to
convict of a lesser included offense. He argues that Counsel should
have presented their own psychiatric expert's report which concluded
that Thompson drank as much as a case of beer or a fifth of whiskey
a day, had suffered from blackouts since the age of 17, smoked up to
a quarter of an ounce of marijuana a day, used Dilaudid, and took
approximately 10 milligrams of Valium each day. Thompson also argues
that Counsel should have argued that Thompson's alcohol and drug use
on the night of the murder left him with diminished capacity.
Prior to trial, trial counsel had filed motions
for a psychiatric examination and an independent psychiatric
examination. As a result, Thompson was evaluated at Taylor Hardin
Secure Medical Facility by a lunacy commission which concluded that
although at the time of "the alleged offense, it is possible Mr.
Thompson was under the influence of self-administered intoxicants,"
Thompson was criminally responsible for his actions at the time of
the crime. Trial counsel felt that the evidence from the Lunacy
Commission that Thompson was competent and that his
self-administered intoxicants did not diminish his criminal
responsibility could have been harmful to Thompson, and thus, did
not present it at trial.
Thompson was also evaluated by Dr. R.A.
Sleszynski, a private psychiatrist hired by trial counsel. Counsel
testified that they did not present the testimony of Dr. Slezynski
because, after discussing the report with Sleszynski, trial counsel
felt that Sleszynski was not sympathetic to their client and that
his attitude on the witness stand would be detrimental to Thompson.
They also believed that Dr. Slezynski's diagnosis that Thompson had
an anti-social personality disorder would harm Thompson. Evidence
regarding Thompson's dependence on alcohol since he was in his teens
and drug use had been otherwise presented to the jury.
Counsel
testified that they considered and weighed the competing factors
regarding Slesznski's impact on the jury and made a strategic
decision not to use him because the possible harm to their client
outweighed the possible benefit. We do not find error in the state
and district court's finding that trial counsel's performance in
this regard did not fall below the standard of professional
performance enunciated in Strickland.
B. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
pertaining to the penalty phase
Thompson first argues that his trial attorneys'
performance at the sentencing phase was ineffective because counsel
performed little pretrial investigation of mitigation evidence and
no preparation for the sentencing phase of trial. As noted above, to
prevail in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a petitioner
must prove both that counsel's actions or omissions were deficient
and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A "reasonable
probability" need not be proof by a preponderance that the result
would have been different, but it must be a showing "sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.See also Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
At the state hearing, Thompson introduced the
following evidence of mental problems and a troubled family history
which he contends should have been presented at trial. Thompson's
mother, Joyce Parker, testified that her husband, Thompson's father,
beat her and all of her children, even while she was pregnant and
that, in addition to the violence Thompson suffered at the hands of
his father, he had also witnessed his grandfather shoot his father
in the shoulder in an attempt to protect Thompson's mother.
Thompson's mother also noted that it was after
his father was killed when Thompson was seventeen years old that
Thompson began using drugs and drinking more. She attributed this to
the fact that Thompson was blamed by his grandmother for his
father's death and felt tremendous guilt. (5) She described Thompson
as a compassionate person who was good with children and reported
that on one occasion Thompson helped a homeless man find shelter and
provided him with food. Finally, she testified that there was a
period of time when Thompson was trying to "live right" and was
going to church, and she believed at that time that Thompson would
become a preacher.
She testified that Dobson and McPherson,
Thompson's lawyers, never contacted her prior to trial, but that she
managed to track them down over the phone and spoke with them
briefly. She briefly spoke with counsel a second time, during trial,
and spoke with them a third time toward the end of trial when they
asked her to beg the jury for his life.
Alford Lett, Thompson's uncle, testified that he
had seen Thompson on at least a weekly basis throughout his life
until Thompson moved in with Franklin. He testified that Thompson "had
a rough ... childhood, all the way through" because of his father's
drinking and physical abuse and that Thompson's father had provided
Thompson with liquor since the age of 10 or 12. He also testified
that he had at times employed Thompson in his sheetrocking business
and that he knew Thompson to be a good worker who would walk away
from trouble rather than fight. Finally, he stated that he was
available to testify but was never contacted by defense counsel.
Leona Thompson, Thompson's sister-in-law,
testified that she had known Thompson for eight years and described
him as a kind person who had gone with her to the hospital when she
was giving birth to her son. She said that Thompson had babysat for
her son when he was three months old and approximately four or five
other times and had taken her and her son to dinner. She testified
that she was present during the trial and would have testified, but
was never contacted by Thompson's attorneys.
Reverend Jerry Fleming, pastor of the church in
Thompson's home town, testified that Thompson attended his church
meetings regularly from March through July of 1984, and that during
this period he was "on fire for God" and deeply concerned about his
mother's spiritual well-being.
He also testified that Thompson was
among a group of people seeking to leave behind a life of addiction
to drugs and find the "straight path." After Thompson stopped
attending church in July, Fleming spoke with Thompson and learned
that Thompson was looking for another job because he could not
resist the peer pressure at his present job. Fleming said that he
had been available to testify at trial in 1985 but was never
contacted by defense counsel.
Thompson testified about his alcohol and drug
problems, his violent upbringing, the traumatic experiences in his
life and head injuries he received as a child.
Finally, Thompson introduced the testimony of Dr.
Beidelman, a clinical psychologist hired by Thompson's collateral
counsel to evaluate Thompson. Dr. Beidelman had interviewed Thompson
and his mother, administered psychological tests, and reviewed the
records in this case.
Based on this information, he opined that
Thompson began abusing alcohol to escape the violence in his home,
becoming dependent on it before he was 10 and began using other
drugs at age 14 under the assistance and influence of his brother;
that Thompson felt he was a coward for not avenging his fathers
death; and that Thompson became involved with Shirley Franklin, a 35
year old woman, when he was 25 and became dependent on her because
she bought him drugs and alcohol.
At the hearing, Thompson's trial counsel also
testified. They both stated that prior to trial, they met with
Thompson numerous times and discussed his defense, trial strategy,
and procedures and continued to do so during trial, each morning and
each evening after proceedings were adjourned.
They testified that
they prepared jointly for the guilt and sentencing phases of trial
because they believed that Thompson's penalty phase defense was
consistent with his defense at trial which was "one of diminished
capacity, limited participation, addiction to drugs and alcohol, and
remorse."
In preparing for this case, they visited the scene of the
crime, interviewed law enforcement personnel involved in the
investigation of this case, searched for witnesses in the community,
spoke with Thompson's mother about his childhood, and interviewed
every person that Thompson named as being a possible witness for him,
both with respect to the crime and mitigation. They did not find
anyone in the community to testify on Thompson's behalf, except for
two of his friends, Jackie Pope and Connie Pope, and his mother,
Joyce Parker.
In addition, counsel interviewed Thompson's brother
before trial, but his brother said that he did not want to say
anything that could hurt Thompson. Trial counsel also asked Thompson
about his childhood, educational background, and drug and alcohol
problems.
They questioned Thompson about his religious affiliations
and he denied any. Trial counsel also advised Thompson as to the
importance of his testifying during the penalty phase and the
possible negative effects of his failure to testify. They urged
Thompson to testify at the penalty phase but he refused.
Defense counsel described their trial strategy as
twofold. First, they sought to cultivate sympathy for and humanize
Thompson by presenting Thompson's testimony regarding his drug and
alcohol problems and the trauma he suffered as a result of his
father's death and by arguing addiction to drugs and alcohol and
remorse. Second, they sought to argue diminished capacity and
limited participation through the cross-examination of Franklin
which they believed would expose that she "was motivated by either
lover's revenge, money, or something."
In rebuttal, the State introduced a transcript of
one of the conversations between Thompson and his attorneys prior to
Thompson's trial, which had been taped by trial counsel. In the
taped conversation Thompson told counsel that he had kidnaped and
robbed Gray, but it had been Shirley Franklin who had ordered her
into the well and shot her.
Counsel had advised Thompson that
relying on that version of events at trial might lead to the
prosecution of Franklin for capital murder and Thompson asserted
that he would stand by that version of events because it was true.
The tape also reveals that counsel discussed Thompson's defense at
trial, including a possible insanity or diminished capacity defense
as well as the procedures required to establish such a defense.
The state trial court found that Thompson's
attorneys were credible witnesses and credited their version of the
facts, finding that Thompson's attorneys were in frequent contact
with Thompson, extensively discussed trial strategy with him, and
interviewed all persons identified by him as possible witnesses at
trial and discredited Joyce Parker's testimony that she had not been
contacted.
Additionally, the state court found that because Thompson
had testified at trial regarding his drug and alcohol abuse and his
father's murder and there was other evidence of his dependence on
drugs and alcohol, much of the mitigating evidence offered at the
hearing would have been cumulative. Finally, the state court found
that the testimony of Thompson's witnesses was "far from compelling
and does not create a reasonable probability that, had it been
presented, Thompson would not have been sentenced to death."
Under the facts of this case, we cannot say that
the state and district court erred in concluding that no reasonable
probability exists that "but for" counsel's failure to present
additional mitigating evidence the results of the sentencing phase
would have been different.
We have considered both the evidence
presented at the trial and the mitigation evidence presented at the
state habeas hearing. Although more evidence could have been
presented, both Thompson and his mother had testified to his abused
childhood, his history of drug and alcohol abuse, and the effect of
his father's murder upon him.
Thompson has not shown that there is a
reasonable probability that the additional testimony presented at
the habeas hearing, which Thompson asserts should have been
presented at trial, would have resulted in a different outcome. The
quality and quantity of this testimony in mitigation must be weighed
against the aggravating factors of this robbery and kidnaping, and
the manner and method of the murder. We cannot say that there is a
probability "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of
this case under the circumstances presented by the aggravating and
available mitigating circumstances in this case.
Finally, Thompson argues that Counsel predisposed
the jury to impose the death penalty by making statements at the
closing argument of the guilt/innocence phase that distanced
themselves from Thompson and dehumanized him in the eyes of the
jury. In this case, Counsel informed the jury that they were court
appointed. With this backdrop, counsel stated in the closing
argument of the guilt/innocence phase:
It is, I think, further indicative to know that
these people that you have heard testify here this week, to the
large part of our population, live in a foreign and strange and
alien atmosphere and environment. Most people in this county, in
fact, the overwhelming majority don't lie around all day drinking
and smoking pot and playing cards. Most of us have a job that we go
to. While some of us may not have the best jobs in the world, and
Rocky Balboa said in the movie Rocky, it's a living. We do it. So,
most of that sort of activity is alien and foreign to our concept of
morality and how we look at the way civilized and normal human
beings ought to act.
... [Thompson has had] one traumatic experience
after another: living on the fringes of society, outside all
acceptable modes or normal behavior, taking up with a 35 year old
woman and living with her. And in order to satisfy his and her drug
habit and their lust, they have engaged in robbery, clear and
undisputed. They have engaged in other activities outside and alien
to the law.
Thompson argues that these comments were
prejudicial and relies on our decision in Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d
1449 (11th Cir.1991), for support. In that case, we recognized that
counsel "virtually encouraged the jury to impose the death penalty"
where counsel told the jury that "the one you judge is not a very
good person ... I ask you for the life of a worthless man," and, "the
prosecutor's closing made me hate my client" followed by:
But then, I ... try to be reasonable about the
whole situation; and I don't hate him as much ... Mr. Briley has
admirably told you just exactly why it is that Jimmy Lee has got to
die. And it becomes my turn to try and explain to you why you don't
have to say he's got to die ... I find my task virtually impossible
... Maybe Mr. Briley is right, maybe he is not. Maybe he ought to
die, but I don't know. Id. at 1462. See also King v. Strickland, 714
F.2d 1481, 1491 (11th Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 467 U.S.
1211, 104 S.Ct. 2651, 81 L.Ed.2d 358 (1984), adhered to on remand,
748 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir.1984); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477
(11th Cir.1991).
Although not as egregious as the statements in
Horton, counsel's statements in closing, as well as counsel's
disclosure to the jury that they were court appointed, hardly
comports with the fundamental duty of loyalty to a client and of
ensuring "that the adversarial testing process works to produce a
just result under the standards governing decision." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Counsel could hardly hope to persuade a
jury to be merciful while at the same time stressing the immoral and
worthless quality of their client's life and also reminding the jury
that they were appointed by the court to represent Thompson.
As we
explained in Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir.1982), "reminding
a jury that the undertaking is not by choice, but in service to the
public, effectively stacks the odds against the accused." Id. at
806. We reiterate that a lawyer does not serve his or her client by
telling the jury that they have been court appointed. Moreover,
although we recognize the need to develop and maintain credibility
and rapport with the jury, it is unreasonable for trial counsel to
do so at the expense of the client's best interests.
Nonetheless, in view of the entire record, we
find that Thompson has not shown a reasonable probability that
counsel's performance affected either the jury's verdict that he was
guilty of capital murder or the jury's recommendation of death. Thus,
for the foregoing reasons, Thompson's conviction and the sentence
imposed upon him must be AFFIRMED.
*****
FOOTNOTES
1. Although the district correct erroneously
applied the AEDPA standards, this error does not affect our analysis
of Thompson's claims.
2. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774,
12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) (trial judge must determine, at a separate
hearing, that a confession is voluntary before it may be heard by a
jury.)
3. The trial court's ruling admitting his
confession as voluntary was based upon an Alabama doctrine known as
the "collateral benefits" doctrine. Accordingly, the state court
felt it unnecessary to make factual findings. However, this doctrine
had been overruled and held unconstitutional prior to his trial. As
a result, Thompson argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 314, 83 S.Ct.
745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963) (holding that where the decision of the
state trier of fact rests "upon an error of law rather than an
adverse determination of the facts, a hearing is compelled to
ascertain the facts.").
4. The Supreme Court has also held that some
types of police deception do not render a confession involuntary.
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684
(1969) ( falsely stating that a co-defendant has turned state's
evidence); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296-97, 110 S.Ct.
2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (installing government agents as
cellmates to elicit statements).
5. According to Dr. Beidleman's testimony at the
state habeas hearing, Thompson was involved in an argument over
payment for work and his father took it upon himself to confront the
man he felt wronged his son. Thompson's father was shot and killed
during the confrontation and Thompson found his father's body.
Thompson felt he was a coward for not avenging his father's death.