Summary:

Stroman entered a convenience store and demanded money from the cashier, 49 year old Vasudev Patel. Stroman then shot the unarmed Patel. The surveillance video showed that while Patel lay dying on the floor, Stroman was unable to open the cash register. Stroman then demanded that Patel “open the register or I’ll kill you." Angry at people of Middle Eastern Descent following the September 11, 2011, terrorist attacks, Stroman’s killing of Patel was the last of a series of violent crimes that he committed against those whom he considered to be of Middle Eastern background. When police arrested him the day Patel was killed, they found the .44-caliber handgun used in the shooting. Stroman confessed, and court documents show he told authorities he belonged to the Aryan Brotherhood.

On September 15, 2001, Stroman murdered Waqar Hasan by shooting him in the head as Hasan grilled hamburgers in his Dallas store. Stroman later told a fellow-prisoner that his murder of Hasan was his ninth crime of this type. Stroman also demonstrated racial motives for the killing, and stated that he was a member of a prison gang, had a .44 pistol and some automatic weapons, and intended to go to a shopping mall and start shooting everybody because of all of the Middle Eastern people there. On September 21, 2001, Stroman shot and wounded Raisuddin Bhuiuian as Bhuiuian worked in a convenience store and service station. Unlike the murder of Patel, the crimes against Hasan and Bhuiuian did not involve robbery. Stroman admitted to all of these crimes and lacked remorse for any of them, claiming that he had performed a patriotic duty. Regarding his murder of Patel, Stroman told the fellow-prisoner that his country “hadn’t done their job so he was going to do it for us.”

Stroman was free on bond for a gun possession arrest when his shooting spree started. He had previous convictions for burglary, robbery, theft and credit card abuse, served at least two prison terms and was paroled twice. His juvenile record showed an armed robbery at age 12.

Citations:

Stroman v. State, Not Reported in S.W.3d, WL 22721137 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). (Direct Appeal)
Stroman v. Thaler, 405 Fed.Appx. 933 (5th Cir. 2010). (Habeas)

Final/Special Meal:

Chicken fried steak with gravy, a ham-and-cheese omelet with onions and tomatoes, bacon, fried potatoes, fried squash and okra, pork chops with eggs sunny-side up, Dr. Pepper and a pint of vanilla Blue Bell ice cream.

Last Words:

"The Lord Jesus Christ be with me. I am at peace. Hate is going on in this world, and it has to stop. One second of hate will cause a lifetime of pain. Even though I lay on this gurney, seconds away from my death, I am at total peace. I'm still a proud American, Texas loud, Texas proud. God bless America. God bless everyone. Let's do this damn thing."

Mark Stroman
Date of Birth: 10/13/1969
DR#: 999409
Date Received: 04/05/2002
Education: 8 years
Occupation: baker, laborer
Date of Offense: 10/04/2001
County of Offense: Dallas
Native County: Dallas
Race: White
Gender: Male
Hair Color: Browen
Eye Color: Hazel
Height: 5' 9"
Weight: 223

Prior Prison Record: Two year sentence for one count of burglary of a building and one count of theft of property; released on parole in absentia; returned from parole in absentia with an 8 year sentence from Dallas County for two counts of credit card abuse and one count of robbery; released on parole on 08/26/1991.

Summary of incident: On 10/04/2001 in Mesquite, Stroman murdered a 49 year old Middle Eastern male convenience store employee during an attempted robbery.

Mark Stroman executed for Dallas-area 9/11 revenge shootings

White supremacist loses appeal in slaying of Mesquite store clerk

DallasNews.com

Associated Press - July 20,  2011

HUNTSVILLE — A Texas inmate has been executed for killing a Dallas-area convenience store clerk as part of a shooting spree that he said was in retaliation for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Mark Stroman was pronounced dead at 8:53 p.m. Wednesday.

The lethal injection was briefly delayed as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered a final appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected appeals earlier Wednesday.

The 41-year-old Stroman claimed the shooting spree that killed two men and injured a third targeted people of Middle Eastern descent, though all three victims were from South Asia. It was the death of 49-year-old Vasudev Patel that put Stroman on death row.

The lone survivor, Rais Bhuiyan, unsuccessfully sued to stop the execution, saying his Muslim beliefs told him to forgive.

Mark Anthony Stroman

ProDeathPenalty.com

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Mark Anthony Stroman, a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, murdered two individuals he believed to be of Middle Eastern descent.

Prosecutors say that just days after the attacks on New York, Washington and Pennsylvania, Stroman began carefully plotting revenge. At the time, he was free on bail for previous crimes.

On September 15, 2001, Stroman shot Waqar Hasan in the head while the man was grilling hamburgers in his convenience store. The 46-year-old Pakistani native had moved to the Dallas area that year to start a new life with his family. 

Six days after murdering Waqar Hasan, Rais Bhuiyan, a Bangladeshi man, was seriously wounded. Stroman shot Bhuiyan in the face while he was working at the counter at a gas station. Rais survived his wounds but was left blind in one eye and severely disfigured. Patel's murder, planned in advance, was captured in graphic detail by the gas station's surveillance camera.

On October 4, Stroman attempted to rob the Mesquite, Texas, gas station operated by Patel. Surveillance tapes showed the suspect waving a .44-caliber chrome-plated pistol at the clerk and demanding, "Open the register or I'll kill you." The 49-year-old Patel, a Hindu, tried to reach for his gun hidden under the counter, but Stroman shot the man in the chest. He left without taking any cash and was arrested the next day. Patel's murder was the last in a series of shootings and it was for that crime that Stroman was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to death.

During the sentencing phase, he made an obscene hand gesture to Hasan's relatives.  Stroman testified at trial that the United States government "hadn't done their job so he was going to do it for them."  Stroman was convicted and sentenced to death. He has never shown remorse for the murders, and he even composed poetry in prison expressing his pride in his crimes. "I cannot tell you that I am an innocent man. I am not asking you to feel sorry for me, and I won't hide the truth," Stroman told CNN in a recent interview. "I am a human being and made a terrible mistake out of love, grief and anger, and believe me, I am paying for it every single minute of the day."

BBC News

A jury in the United States has convicted a man who shot dead an Indian immigrant in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks.

Mark Stroman told police that he killed Vasudev Patel, the owner of a petrol station in Texas, last October because he wanted vengeance for the attacks on New York and Washington.

Stroman has also been charged with another murder and the shooting of a third man - both of them Pakistani.

No. 74,354

Mark Stroman, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas

In his first point of error, Stroman asserts that Article 37.071 is unconstitutional because the death penalty violates evolving standards of decency. Specifically, he asserts that developing evidence regarding the number of innocent individuals on death row across the nation shows that the death penalty as it is currently administered is flawed and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.

Neither does Ring support Stroman's argument. Ring, like Apprendi, refers to an increase in penalty over the statutory maximum. In Texas, the statutory maximum for a capital offense is death. The mitigation issue does not increase the statutory maximum. To the contrary, the mitigation issue is designed to allow for the imposition of less than the statutory maximum, a life sentence.

So the United States Constitution does not require the State to bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there is insufficient mitigation evidence to support a life sentence. Nor did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury to this effect or in refusing to allow defense counsel to question prospective jurors on the issue. Point of error two is overruled.

Finally, in his sixth point of error, Stroman complains that the trial court erred by permitting the State to impeach his key expert witness "by eliciting the fact that she had testified for the defense in other notorious cases in which the jury imposed the death penalty." He asserts that "[t]his line" of cross-examination was improper and was clearly designed to discredit Stroman's expert witness "by portraying her as a 'hired-gun' . . . [who] finds mitigating circumstances no matter how gruesome the offense." However, Stroman then concedes that this line of questioning "and its implicit significance" should be permitted. He agrees that cross-examining experts about who "butters their bread" is a classic method of cross-examining an expert for bias. He even admits that it is permissible to cross-examine experts about the opinions they rendered in previous cases in order to evaluate the expert's consistency. Nevertheless, he asserts that the "line of permissibility" is crossed when the evidence fails to show an inconsistency. In other words, Stroman argues that the State presented improper impeachment evidence.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

DATE DELIVERED: November 19, 2003

Stroman v. Thaler, 405 Fed.Appx. 933 (5th Cir. 2010) (Habeas)

PER CURIAM:

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Mark Anthony Stroman, a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, murdered two individuals he believed to be of Middle Eastern descent. He was convicted and sentenced to death. He sought federal habeas relief; the district court denied his petition and refused to grant a certificate of appealability (COA). Stroman now seeks a COA from this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Because reasonable jurists would not find it debatable that the district court's rejection of the underlying habeas petition was correct, Stroman's application for a COA is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Stroman murdered a gas station attendant, Vasudev Patel, in the course of an attempted robbery. Patel's murder was the last in a series of shootings—resulting in two individuals killed and one severely disfigured—that Stroman committed post–9/11 against those whom he believed to be of Middle Eastern descent. Stroman testified at trial that the United States government “hadn't done their job so he was going to do it for them.” Patel's murder, planned in advance, was captured in graphic detail by the gas station's surveillance camera. Stroman was convicted and sentenced to death. He has never shown remorse for the murders, and he even composed poetry in prison expressing his pride in his crimes.

The district court denied Stroman's habeas petition, concluding, among other things, that all but three of Stroman's claims were unexhausted and therefore procedurally barred, and the claims that were not procedurally barred warranted no habeas relief. Stroman now moves for a COA.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a petitioner seeking a COA must demonstrate “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” In Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified: “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” 537 U.S. at 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000)). The district court's review of the conviction was, like ours, guided by the deferential standards of AEDPA.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Stroman's Unexhausted and Procedurally Barred Claims

Stroman's habeas petition presented several unexhausted claims, including: actual innocence; lack of a presumption of innocence; lack of a fair defense; and ineffective assistance of counsel claims for failure to investigate and failure to introduce favorable evidence. Stroman does not contend that the claims are exhausted. He instead argues that: (1) he is excused from exhaustion because he is actually innocent; (2) the state corrective procedure was ineffective to protect his rights as per 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii); and (3) his failure to exhaust is excused in light of Ruiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 523 (5th Cir.2007).

We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that the district court's treatment of the actual innocence claim is not debatable among jurists of reason. To receive a hearing on the merits on a successive habeas claim, a petitioner “ ‘must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’ in light of newly discovered evidence.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 332–33, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Moreover, the “new reliable evidence” ought to consist of “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851). Stroman's proffered evidence of mental problems falls far short of this demanding standard. The district court correctly applied this standard.

As to his claim of ineffective process, Stroman points to a “systemic failure of the [Texas] habeas system to provide competent counsel to investigate and present habeas claims to the Texas courts.” There is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Thus, the district court correctly noted that numerous Fifth Circuit decisions reject this premise as a ground for habeas relief. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Quarterman, 460 F.3d 638, 644 (5th Cir.2006) (“Yet the law of this Court is clear: ineffective state habeas counsel does not excuse failure to raise claims in state habeas proceedings.”).

Stroman also mistakenly claims that a different Ruiz decision— Ruiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 523 (5th Cir.2007)—excuses his failure to exhaust his claims. Ruiz held that Tex.Code Crim. Proc., art. 11.071, § 5(a)(1), did not serve, under unusual circumstances, as an independent and adequate state bar when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals failed to state the basis for its rejection of a successive petition. Here, Stroman never filed a successive state petition, and thus, there never was a § 5(a) ruling. The Fifth Circuit has held post- Ruiz that § 5(a) remains an independent and adequate state ground for the purpose of imposing a procedural bar. See Hughes v. Quarterman, 530 F.3d 336, 342 (5th Cir.2008); see also Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387 (5th Cir.2010) (denying an application for a COA as an abuse of the writ under § 5), clarified and panel rehearing denied, 626 F.3d 815 (5th Cir.2010). Ruiz does not excuse Stroman's failure to exhaust.

B. Stroman's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Stroman has properly exhausted two ineffective assistance of counsel claims: one for his counsel's failure to challenge a juror, and another for his counsel's failure to object to purported hearsay. The record demonstrates, however, that the district court carefully and correctly analyzed both prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Stroman cannot demonstrate an arguable infringement of his right to effective assistance of counsel. Reasonable jurists could not debate that the state court's denial of relief must be sustained under AEDPA.

IV. CONCLUSION