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John Manuel
QUINTANILLA Jr.
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics: Holdup
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder: November 24,
2002
Date
of arrest: January 14,
2003
Date of birth:
December 9,
1976
Victim profile: Victor Billings, 60 (retired deputy)
Method of murder:
Shooting
Location: Victoria County, Texas, USA
Status: Sentenced to death December 8, 2004. Executed by lethal
injection on July 12, 2013
Summary:
Quintanilla and accomplice Jeffrey Bibb entered a game center in
Victoria through a partially opened back door, carrying rifles and
wearing gloves and pantyhose masks.
While his accomplice went to the game parlor,
Quintanilla walked up to the clerk and ordered her to give him the
money in her apron, which she did. Quintanilla was pointing his
rifle at the clerk and at customer Linda Billings, who was
standing next to her, when Billings' husband, Victor, 60, came up.
Quintanilla shot Victor twice. Victor grabbed the muzzle of
Quintanilla's gun, and he fired again. Quintanilla then shot at
two customers as they ran out the front door. The head-high shots
missed the customers and struck the door area. Victor Billings
died from gunshot wounds to the torso. The robbers then fled with
about $2,000.
Quintanilla was arrested in January 2003 on a
warrant for an unrelated aggravated robbery. While in custody, he
confessed to the murder at the game center. He then led
authorities to a canal where divers recovered items used in the
robbery. Accomplice Bibb was convicted of murder and received a
60-year prison sentence.
Citations:
Quintanilla v. State, Not Reported in S.W.3d (Tex.Crim.App.
2007). (Direct Appeal) Quintanilla v. Thaler, 443 Fed.Appx. 919 (5th Cir. 2011).
(Federal Habeas)
Final/Special Meal:
Texas no longer offers a special "last meal" to condemned inmates.
Instead, the inmate is offered the same meal served to the rest of
the unit.
Final/Last Words:
Asked to make a final statement before his execution, Quintanilla
told his wife he loved her. "Thank you for all the years of
happiness." He never acknowledged his victim's friends or
relatives, including two daughters, who watched through a window.
ClarkProsecutor.org
Texas Department of Criminal
Justice
John Manuel Quintanilla Jr.
Date of Birth: 12/09/1976
DR#: 999491
Date Received: 12/08/2004
Education: 8 years
Occupation: laborer
Date of Offense: 11/24/2002
County of Offense: Victoria
Native County: Calhoun
Race: Black
Gender: Male
Hair Color: Black
Eye Color: Brown
Height: 5' 08"
Weight: 153
Prior Prison Record: TDCJ #701105 on a 10 year
sentence from Victoria County for 2 counts of Burglary Habitation
and Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity.
Summary of Incident: On 11/24/2002 in Victoria,
Texas, Quintanilla and two male co-defendants entered an action
amusement center through a partially opened back door, demanded
cash from an employee and advised all other patrons to get down on
the floor. An adult white male attempted to disarm Quintanilla and
was fatally shot three times. A second victim, and adult white
female, was also shot, but the injury was not fatal.
Co-Defendants: Jeffrey Bibb and Rodney
Rodriguez.
Texas Attorney General
Thursday, July 11, 2013
Media Advisory: John Manuel Quintanilla
scheduled for execution
VICTORIA – Pursuant to a court order by the
377th Judicial District Court in Victoria County, John Manuel
Quintanilla is scheduled for execution after 6 p.m. on July 16,
2013. In 2004, a Victoria County jury found Quintanilla guilty of
murdering Victor Billings in the course of committing or
attempting to commit robbery.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The facts of the crime were not summarized by
any court reviewing the case, which focused on the specific facts
surrounding Quintanilla’s confessions. Quintanilla and another man
walked into a game parlor in Victoria, Texas, in the evening hours
of November 24, 2002. Victor Billings, a retired law enforcement
officer, was playing games inside, as was his wife of forty years,
Linda. Quintanilla and his partner wore pantyhose masks and
carried long rifles. One robber went into the parlor office while
Quintanilla ordered the clerk, standing next to Mrs. Billings, to
give him the money in her apron. She complied. Quintanilla later
stated he stole some two thousand dollars from the game parlor
that day. Quintanilla was pointing his rifle at the employee and
Mrs. Billings. Victor Billings walked up to his wife and
Quintanilla shot him twice. Billings grabbed the muzzle of the gun
and Quintanilla shot him a third time, knocking him flat to the
ground. Billings died of these gunshot wounds to the torso. Two
patrons ran out the front door and Quintanilla shot at them from
the rear of the facility. The shots were head high and struck the
front door area.
At punishment, the State additionally presented
testimony of Dr. Richard Coons, a forensic psychiatrist, who
opined on the basis of a hypothetical question greatly resembling
the facts of this case that such an inmate would probably be a
future danger, and would be a greater risk if sentenced to life
than if he were sent to death row. After the State rested its
punishment case, the court convened a hearing outside the presence
of the jury. Trial counsel for Quintanilla indicated they would
rest, in obedience to their client’s instructions. The trial court
questioned Quintanilla regarding his awareness and understanding
of his right to present evidence on punishment and the possible
benefit of such evidence. Quintanilla confirmed that it was his
considered wish not to present evidence in mitigation or regarding
future dangerousness. Before the jury, defense counsel rested.
On the following day, before argument began and
outside the jury’s presence, the court again addressed Quintanilla
and emphasized the possible benefits of presenting evidence in
mitigation. The court additionally pointed out that trial counsel
had the expertise and experience to make determinations regarding
useful evidence, and that without any punishment evidence from the
defense, the jury’s decision would be based solely on the State’s
presentation. Quintanilla repeatedly indicated that he had fully
discussed this issue with his attorneys and that his decision was
made freely, knowingly and voluntarily. Defense counsel indicated
that they disagreed with Quintanilla’s decision but did not
believe him to be incompetent in any way, and the court concurred.
Counsel added that this had been an “ongoing situation” for the
two years he had represented the defendant, and that both
attorneys had counseled Quintanilla at great length for those two
years without success in changing his position.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2003, a Victoria County grand jury indicted
Quintanilla for murdering Victor Billings while committing or
attempting to commit robbery on or about Nov. 24, 2002.
In 2004, a Victoria County jury found
Quintanilla guilty of murdering Victor Billings. The jury
recommended capital punishment, and on Dec. 14, 2004, the court
sentenced Quintanilla to death by lethal injection.
On June 27, 2007, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed Quintanilla’s conviction and sentence.
Quintanilla did not file a petition for a writ
of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
On June 22, 2006, Quintanilla sought a state
writ of habeas corpus with the state trial court.
In 2007, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing on the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
On June 4, 2008, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas relief.
On May 30, 2009, Quintanilla filed a federal
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On Jan. 25, 2011, the federal district court
denied Quintanilla’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
On Oct. 17, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit denied COA.
On Jan. 6, 2012, Quintanilla filed a petition
for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
On March 19, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court
denied Quintanilla’s petition for writ of certiorari.
On July 9, 2013, Quintanilla filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court.
On July 11, 2013, the U.S. district court
transferred petition to the U.S.Court of Appeals.
On July 11, 2013, Quintanilla filed a motion
for stay of execution.
On July 13, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals
denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and stay.
On July 15, 2013, Quantanilla filed a petition
for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
On July 16, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
Quantanilla's petition for writ of certiorari and a motion for
stay of execution.
PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY
Under Texas law, the rules of evidence prevent
certain prior criminal acts from being presented to a jury during
the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. However, once a defendant
is found guilty, jurors are presented information about the
defendant’s prior criminal conduct during the second phase of the
trial – which is when they determine the defendant’s punishment.
At punishment, the State presented testimony that
Quintanilla committed another five armed robberies or burglaries,
and attempted to commit a sixth, beginning in September 2002 and
continuing through January 2003. Further, Quintanilla stabbed and
sliced guards with improvised weapons and razor blades while
trying to escape from the county jail in January 2003.
Penitentiary packets revealed that Quintanilla pled guilty to
second-degree felony burglary of a habitation in 1995 and received
a 10-year sentence. Quintanilla also pled no contest to five other
burglaries in 1995.
Texas man executed for
killing during 2002 holdup
By Michael Graczyk - Associated Press
Chron.com
July 16, 2013
HUNTSVILLE, Texas (AP) — A Texas man convicted
of fatally shooting a retired sheriff's deputy during the robbery
of an amusement center more than a decade ago was put to death
Tuesday. John Manuel Quintanilla received lethal injection for
gunning down 60-year-old Victor Billings at a game room in
Victoria, about 125 miles southwest of Houston. The 2002 slaying
came just a few months after Quintanilla had been released from
prison after serving a sentence for several burglary convictions.
Asked to make a final statement before his
execution, Quintanilla told his wife he loved her. "Thank you for
all the years of happiness," he said. He never acknowledged his
victim's friends or relatives, including two daughters, who
watched through a window. As the lethal drug began taking effect,
he snored about a half dozen times, then stopped breathing. At
7:32 p.m. CDT — 15 minutes after being given the drug — he was
pronounced dead. Quintanilla's wife, a German national who married
him by proxy while he was in prison, watched through an adjacent
window and sobbed.
Quintanilla, 36, became the ninth Texas inmate
to receive lethal injection this year and the 501st since the
state resumed carrying out capital punishment in 1982. His was the
first of two executions set for this week; the other is planned
for Thursday. Quintanilla's punishment was carried out after the
U.S. Supreme Court refused two last-day appeals. His lawyers
contended his confession was coerced by authorities threatening to
also charge one of his sisters and that the statement improperly
was allowed into evidence at his trial in 2004. The lawyers
obtained affidavits from two jurors who said the confession was a
key to their decision to convict him. "It is clear that
Quintanilla would not have been convicted of capital murder if his
confession had not been admitted — a fact confirmed by two of his
jurors," appeals lawyer David Dow told the high court. The appeal
also argued Quintanilla had deficient legal help during his trial
and in earlier stages of his appeals, and that his case would give
justices the opportunity to define filing rules in light of recent
death penalty rulings from the court.
The Texas attorney general's office said the
appeal was without merit and improperly filed, and that the juror
affidavits also were improper. "There wasn't any coercion
whatsoever," Dexter Eaves, the former Victoria County district
attorney who was lead prosecutor at the trial, recalled last week.
He also said that while the robbers, who fled with about $2,000,
were masked, witnesses were able to "describe very clearly who the
triggerman was." Court records show Billings, a retired chief
deputy from nearby Edna in adjacent Jackson County, was at the
game center with his wife on the Sunday before Thanksgiving in
2002 when the gunmen came in through a back door. Billings
approached one of them and grabbed the barrel of the gunman's
rifle "so no one else was going to be hurt and paid for it
dearly," Eaves said. He said Billings was shot three times, the
last one fired while he was on his knees. "A very cold killing,"
Eaves said.
During questioning by detectives for an
unrelated robbery some two months later, Quintanilla made
references to the still unsolved Billings case, then led
authorities to a canal where divers recovered items used in the
holdup. "They had the mask, the guns and his statements saying who
did what," Jim Beeler, Quintanilla's lead trial lawyer, said. "He
told them everything." Beeler said the trial judge overruled his
objections and ruled the statements proper and admissible into
evidence. He also said Quintanilla signed affidavits ordering that
his defense team present no mitigating evidence during the
punishment phase of his trial, where jurors deciding his sentence
could have considered he had virtually no parental supervision
while growing up. "You want to argue your case, completely and
totally," Beeler said. "In that situation, we're not being allowed
to present our case, based on our client. "It's extremely
frustrating."
Prosecutors bolstered their case for
Quintanilla's future dangerousness by presenting evidence he
attacked a jailer with a homemade weapon while awaiting trial. "He
did not do himself any favors," Eaves said. Quintanilla's
accomplice, Jeffrey Bibb, 33, is serving 60 years for murder and
50 years for aggravated robbery.
Texas man executed for
killing during holdup
By Cody Stark - ItemOnline.com
July 16, 2013
HUNTSVILLE — A South Texas man was put to death
Tuesday night for the slaying of a retired sheriff’s deputy during
a robbery more than 10 years ago. John Manuel Quintanilla Jr., 36,
was executed by lethal injection for the 2002 murder of
60-year-old Victor Billings at an amusement center in Victoria.
Earlier Tuesday, the United States Supreme Court refused two
appeals to halt the execution.
Quintanilla did not have much to say when asked
if he wanted to make a final statement Tuesday. He just wanted his
wife to know he loved her. “I would like to tell my wife I love
her and thank her for all the years of happiness,” Quintanilla
said of his wife, a German national he married by proxy while he
was on death row. Quintanilla then told the warden to proceed. He
began to snore as the drug took effect and lost consciousness.
Quintanilla was pronounced dead at 7:32 p.m., 15 minutes after the
lethal dose began. He is the ninth inmate to be executed in Texas
this year.
According to court documents, Quintanilla had
recently been released from prison after serving time for several
burglary convictions when he and another gunman entered a game
room through the back door on Nov. 24, 2002 and demanded money.
Billings, a retired chief deputy with the Jackson County Sheriff’s
Department, was with his wife at the establishment and grabbed the
barrel of Quintanilla’s rifle and tried to stop the robbery.
Billings was fatally shot three times. Two months later,
Quintanilla was being questioned by authorities for an unrelated
robbery when he made reference to the Billings murder and later
led detectives to a canal where divers discovered items used in
the robbery.
In his appeals, Quintanilla’s lawyers contended
his confession was coerced by authorities threatening to also
charge one of his sisters and that the statement improperly was
allowed into evidence at his trial in 2004. They obtained
affidavits from two jurors who said the confession was a key to
their decision to convict him. “It is clear that Quintanilla would
not have been convicted of capital murder if his confession had
not been admitted — a fact confirmed by two of his jurors,”
appeals lawyer David Dow told the high court. The appeal also
argued Quintanilla had deficient legal help during his trial and
in earlier stages of his appeals, and that his case would give
justices the opportunity to define filing rules in light of recent
death penalty rulings from the court. The Texas attorney general’s
office said the appeal was without merit and improperly filed, and
that the juror affidavits also were improper.
Quintanilla’s accomplice, Jeffrey Bibb, 33, is
serving 60 years for murder and 50 years for aggravated robbery.
Texas executes man for fatal shooting of
retired deputy in 2002 robbery
DallasNews.com
July 16, 2013
HUNTSVILLE — A Texas man convicted of fatally
shooting a retired sheriff's deputy during the robbery of an
amusement center more than a decade ago was put to death Tuesday
evening. John Manuel Quintanilla died by lethal injection for
gunning down 60-year-old Victor Billings at a game room in
Victoria, about 125 miles southwest of Houston. The 2002 slaying
came just a few months after Quintanilla had been released from
prison after serving a sentence for several burglary convictions.
Asked to make a final statement before his
execution, Quintanilla told his wife he loved her. "Thank you for
all the years of happiness," he said. He never acknowledged his
victim's friends or relatives, including two daughters, who
watched through a window. As the lethal drug began taking effect,
he snored about a half dozen times, then stopped breathing.
Fifteen minutes after being given the drug, at 7:32 p.m. CDT, he
was pronounced dead. Quintanilla's wife, a German national who
married him by proxy while he was in prison, watched through an
adjacent window and sobbed.
Quintanilla, 36, became the ninth Texas inmate
to receive lethal injection this year and the 501st since the
state resumed carrying out capital punishment in 1982. His was the
first of two executions this week. The punishment was carried out
after the U.S. Supreme Court refused two last-day appeals.
Quintanilla's lawyers contended his confession was coerced by
authorities threatening to also charge one of his sisters and that
the statement improperly was allowed into evidence at his trial in
2004. They obtained affidavits from two jurors who said the
confession was a key to their decision to convict him. "It is
clear that Quintanilla would not have been convicted of capital
murder if his confession had not been admitted — a fact confirmed
by two of his jurors," appeals lawyer David Dow told the high
court.
The appeal also argued Quintanilla had
deficient legal help during his trial and in earlier stages of his
appeals, and that his case would give justices the opportunity to
define filing rules in light of recent death penalty rulings from
the court. The Texas attorney general's office said the appeal was
without merit and improperly filed, and that the juror affidavits
also were improper. "There wasn't any coercion whatsoever," Dexter
Eaves, the former Victoria County district attorney who was lead
prosecutor at the trial, recalled last week. He also said that
while the robbers, who fled with about $2,000, were masked,
witnesses were able to "describe very clearly who the triggerman
was."
Court records show Billings, a retired chief
deputy from nearby Edna in adjacent Jackson County, was at the
game center with his wife on the Sunday before Thanksgiving in
2002 when the gunmen came in through a back door. Billings
approached one of them and grabbed the barrel of the gunman's
rifle "so no one else was going to be hurt and paid for it
dearly," Eaves said. He said Billings was shot three times, the
last one fired while he was on his knees. "A very cold killing,"
Eaves said.
During questioning by detectives for an
unrelated robbery some two months later, Quintanilla made
references to the still unsolved Billings case, then led
authorities to a canal where divers recovered items used in the
holdup. "They had the mask, the guns and his statements saying who
did what," Jim Beeler, Quintanilla's lead trial lawyer, said. "He
told them everything." Beeler said the trial judge overruled his
objections and ruled the statements proper and admissible into
evidence. He also said Quintanilla signed affidavits ordering his
defense team present no mitigating evidence during the punishment
phase of his trial, where jurors deciding his sentence could have
considered he had virtually no parental supervision while growing
up. "You want to argue your case, completely and totally," Beeler
said. "In that situation, we're not being allowed to present our
case, based on our client. "It's extremely frustrating."
Prosecutors bolstered their case for
Quintanilla's future dangerousness by presenting evidence he
attacked a jailer with a homemade weapon while awaiting trial. "He
did not do himself any favors," Eaves said. Quintanilla's
accomplice, Jeffrey Bibb, 33, is serving 60 years for murder and
50 years for aggravated robbery.
John Manuel Quintanilla, Jr.
ProDeathPenalty.com
On November 24, 2002, in Victoria, 27-year-old
John Manuel Quintanilla, Jr. and an accomplice entered an action
amusement center through a partially opened back door, demanded
cash from an employee and advised all other patrons to get down on
the floor. Victor Billings, a former Jackson County, Texas
sheriff's deputy, was with his wife at the center. He attempted to
disarm Quintanilla in an effort to protect his wife and was
fatally shot three times when he grabbed the barrel of the 9 mm
carbine rifle. A 56-year-old woman was also shot in the foot.
Right after shooting Billings, Quintanilla
noticed two other customers trying to leave through the front
door. He aimed and fired at the doorway, head high. The robbery
amount was $2000. Victoria police officers testified that when
they received the report of shooting at the game room, they didn't
know whether or not the shooters were still inside. Senior Patrol
Officer Eddie Stevens was dispatched to the call shortly before 7
p.m. It took him 2 minutes to get across town. He was the 1st
person on the scene, Stevens said. One of the customers who had
run out of the business during the shooting came up to him,
Stevens said. "He advised me he did not see anybody else run out,"
Stevens said. "We did not know if we still had an active shooter
inside."
When Sgt. Ralph Buentello arrived a couple of
minutes later, the scene was still chaotic, Buentello said. "The
immediate situation was extremely unstable as we tried to
determine if we still had people inside." Knowing that the
department's Special Response Team would take about 40 minutes to
mobilize and be at the business, Buentello decided to send three
officers in through the front door. Standing behind a 4-foot-tall
ballistic shield, the officers made their way in, thus allowing
the dead man's wife, Linda Billings, and another woman to run out.
Bradley Hill, Victoria Fire Department
emergency medical technician, testified that he and his partner
had waited at a distance from the game room until police had
assured its safety. He testified that Billings was lying face down
in the floor and showed no respiration or pulse.
Quintanilla was linked to a series of other
armed robberies in the area in the same time span. Quintanilla had
a substantial criminal record. While in jail awaiting trial on
this charge, he made two “shanks” (knives) and attacked a guard in
an escape attempt. Quintanilla confessed to the murder of
Billings, but the defense tried to plant doubt that he was really
the robber, suggesting that he was taking the blame for the
husband of a relative. At the penalty phase, Quintanilla refused
to permit his lawyers to present any evidence. Following testimony
in the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found a probability
that Quintanilla would commit future acts of criminal violence
constituting a continuing threat to society. Accordingly, the
trial court sentenced Quintanilla to death.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
No. AP-75,061
JOHN MANUEL QUINTANILLA, JR., Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appeal of Case
03-3-20,037-D
377th District Court of
Victoria County
Womack,
J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
A jury found the appellant guilty of the November 24, 2002
capital murder of Victor Billings. The trial court sentenced the
appellant to death based on the jury's verdict on the issues of
punishment.
(1)
In the appeal to this court, which a statute requires,
(2)
the appellant raises two points of error. We find them to be
without merit, and we affirm the judgment.
I. The Facts
The appellant was arrested on January 14,
2003 on a warrant from Calhoun County for an unrelated
aggravated robbery. At that time, no charges had been brought
nor had a warrant issued for the instant offense.
At 2:30 p.m. on January 15, 2003, the
appellant was taken before a magistrate for the warnings and
other proceedings that Article 15.17 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure required.
(3)
The appellant requested that an attorney be appointed.
At approximately 4:00 p.m., Investigator Abel
Arriazola of the Victoria County Sheriff's Office and
Investigator Mike Kovorek of the Calhoun County Sheriff's
Department began interrogating the appellant. They recorded the
interview on a videotape, later labeled State's Exhibit 1a.
Prior to questioning, Arriazola gave the appellant his
Miranda warnings.
The appellant indicated he understood his
rights and wished to continue with the interview. The appellant
made no statements regarding the capital murder, nor did he
invoke his right to counsel, during this portion of the
interview.
At approximately 7:55 p.m., the officers and the appellant took
a short break, which marked the end of State's Exhibit 1a. A new
videotape, which eventually would be labeled State's Exhibit 1b,
was inserted in the videotape recorder. The appellant and
Kovorek returned to the room at about 8:10 p.m. to continue the
interrogation; then Kovorek left the room again.
A short time after that, at about 8:35 p.m., Arriazola returned,
now with Detectives Alfred Santiago and Tom Copeland of the
Victoria Police Department. Arriazola told the appellant, "Nothing
has changed from the time I've talked to you," by which he meant,
according to his testimony in the pre-trial hearing, "that [the
appellant's] rights were still in full effect."
Santiago and Copeland testified that they were aware that
Arriazola had already informed the appellant of his Miranda
rights, and so they began their interrogation, which
included questions regarding the capital murder, without re-administering
the warnings. About fifteen minutes into the interview, however,
the detectives reminded the appellant of his Miranda
rights and that Arriazola had read him his rights; the appellant
acknowledged that he remembered and understood those rights.
Santiago later acknowledged in his pre-trial testimony that he
inadvertently left out the warning that an attorney would be
appointed if the appellant could not afford to hire one. At no
time during the interview did the appellant invoke his right to
counsel. During the interrogation by Santiago and Copeland, the
appellant made inculpatory statements regarding the instant
offense.
As a result of a pre-trial hearing, the trial
court entered the following required findings of fact and
conclusions of law
(4)
concerning the admissibility of the appellant's statement
contained in State's Exhibits 1a and 1b:
-- the appellant received the Article 15.17
magistrate's warning on, and requested an attorney for, the
aggravated-robbery offense for which he had been arrested on the
warrant from Calhoun County;
-- the appellant had not been arrested on the
capital-murder offense in Victoria County at the time of the
interview;
-- State's Exhibits 1a and 1b constituted one
continuous interview, and therefore the Miranda
warnings Arriazola gave at the beginning of videotape 1a applied
to the entire interview;
-- the Miranda warnings given by
Arriazola complied with Article 38.22;
-- the appellant freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily waived his rights as to the capital murder at the
beginning of videotape 1a, including the right to a court-appointed
attorney; and
-- the appellant's statements regarding the
Calhoun County aggravated robbery were taken in violation of the
Sixth Amendment, but this did not prohibit the admission of
statements as to other offenses.
Portions of State's Exhibits 1a and 1b were
consolidated into State's Exhibit 29, a videotape that was then
admitted into evidence at the guilt phase of the trial. State's
Exhibit 29 contains only those portions of the interview that
relate to the offense at hand, including Arriazola's initial
warnings to the appellant, the introduction of Santiago and
Copeland, the reminder of the appellant's Miranda
warnings, and the appellant's statements regarding the instant
offense. All references to the Calhoun County aggravated robbery
and other extraneous offenses were omitted.
II. Admissibility of Appellant's Statement
In point of error one, the appellant claims
that the trial court erred in admitting State's Exhibit 29 on
two grounds: that the videotaped statement regarding the instant
offense was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment "right
to counsel," and also in violation of Article 38.22 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. We will address these grounds in
turn.
Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Fifth Amendment right to counsel provides
"prophylactic rights designed to counteract the 'inherently
compelling pressures' of custodial interrogation."
(5)
The "right to counsel" under the Fifth Amendment may be waived,
but its invocation prevents any further interrogation of a
suspect unless counsel is present.
(6)
The Fifth Amendment right to counsel is not offense-specific,
and it thus precludes interrogation regarding any offense in the
absence of counsel once the right has been invoked.
(7)
The appellant admits that he was informed of,
and waived, his Fifth Amendment rights at the beginning of the
interview, as recorded on State's Exhibit 29. He argues that his
request for counsel when he appeared before the magistrate after
being arrested for aggravated robbery serves as a non-offense-specific
Fifth Amendment invocation of counsel, thereby rendering
inadmissible even his subsequent statements regarding the
instant offense.
The appellant seems to imply that his Fifth
Amendment right to counsel was triggered by, at least in part,
the magistrate's act of reading the Article 15.17 warnings that
comply with Miranda.
(8) However,
the warnings themselves and the administration of those warnings
do not confer the right. The right stems from its narrow
association with the process of police custodial interrogation,
and can be invoked only as a specific articulation of a desire
for assistance of counsel with that process.
(9)
The appellant confuses the issue by
interchanging Texas statutory provisions with U. S.
constitutional law throughout his brief. His constitutional
argument is based on language he extracts from Dowthitt v.
State
(10)
and Articles 38.22
(11) and 15.17.
(12) Also, by
referring to the Article 15.17 magistration warnings as "Miranda"
warnings, he implies that the Article 15.17 proceeding has Fifth
Amendment importance with regard to the right to counsel. It
does not.
The appellant cites Robinson v. State
(13)
to argue that this court supports his position. The issue in
Robinson, however,turned on whether the appellant
had effectively requested assistance of counsel at all.
(14) The
appellant in that case was warned not only by two magistrates,
but -- more importantly to the analysis -- twice by police as
well.
(15) The Court
there did not identify precisely when the Fifth Amendment right
would have attached, but the statement the Court found to fail
as a request for counsel under the Fifth Amendment was made to
police during interrogation, not to the magistrates.
(16)
The appellant here contends that our holding
in Robinson implies that the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel attaches at an Article 15.17 magistration, because, he
asserts, we found the appellant in Robinson had not
invoked his Fifth Amendment right when brought before the
magistrates. Robinson, however,does not stand
for this proposition.
The appellant ignores the critical fact that
the appellant in Robinson had also been warned by
police prior to his interrogation, a fact that the Supreme Court
has identified as the narrow situation in which the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel is implicated. We find the
appellant's Fifth Amendment argument unconvincing.
Article 38.22
The appellant also claims that State's
Exhibit 29 was admitted in error because the statement contained
therein was obtained in violation of Article 38.22 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. He raises several issues under this claim.
First, the appellant claims that he invoked
his Article 38.22 "right to counsel" at his magistration for
aggravated robbery. Article 38.22 confers no such right. The
statute governs the admissibility of an accused's statement and,
among its provisions, outlines the procedures that must be
followed in order to use that statement in a criminal proceeding.
The right conferred can better be expressed as a right to
receive warnings: the accused must be given the equivalent of
Miranda warnings in order for his statement as a result
of custodial interrogation to be admissible.
(18)
The provision is satisfied merely by giving the warnings,
without any obligation to ensure that the substance of the
warnings is carried out. Section 3 of Article 38.22 applies to
oral statements, and its provisions include the requirement of
an electronic recording
(19) and the
requirement that during the recording the suspect must receive
Article 38.22 warnings and voluntarily waive his or her rights.
(20)
The appellant here does not suggest a
violation of these requirements took place, and in fact the
record supports the conclusion that State's Exhibit 29 complied
with these statutory requirements. Further, the appellant
acknowledges this court's holding that the warnings provision in
Section 2 of Article 38.22 applying to written statements --
that warnings must be given by the person "to whom the statement
is made" -- does not apply to oral statements.
Arriazola's warnings at the beginning of the appellant's
interview were therefore effective for the purposes of Article
38.22, despite the fact that Santiago and Copeland were the
officers present when the appellant made the statements at issue
here. It is inconsequential that Santiago's later warnings
failed to comply with Article 38.22.
Instead, the appellant argues: "Art. 38.22,
Section 2(a), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, specifically
provides that receiving from a magistrate the warning provided
in Article 15.17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is sufficient
to comply with the warnings requirement of Art. 38.22."
(22)
This is essentially a rehashing of his Fifth Amendment argument:
that since the appellant was warned by a magistrate during an
Article 15.17 proceeding in a manner complying with Article
38.22, and invoked his right to counsel in that proceeding, his
subsequent statement in the absence of counsel is inadmissible
under Article 38.22.
This argument simply ignores the fact that Section 2 of Article
38.22 applies to written, not oral, statements, and that a
magistrate's Article 15.17 warnings are ineffective as to oral
statements, whose warnings must be given and waived on the
actual recording.
(23) Article
38.22, Section 3 requirements were met; the magistrate's
warnings are irrelevant to this determination.
The appellant also points to one particular
warning given to him at his Article 15.17 proceeding for
aggravated robbery: the "right to have an attorney present
during any interview with peace officers."
(24) The
appellant seems to assert that "any interview" should be read
literally to mean any subsequent interview with police
officers regarding any offenses, including those
unrelated to that charge for which the appellant was magistrated,
and that this right was therefore violated when the appellant
was interviewed regarding the instant offense.
The Supreme Court in McNeil
expressly rejected an identical argument on policy grounds:
(25)
The proposed rule would seriously impede
effective law enforcement. . . . [M]ost persons in pretrial
custody for serious offenses would be unapproachable by
police officers suspecting them of involvement in other crimes,
even though they have never expressed any unwillingness to
be questioned.
Since the ready ability to obtain uncoerced
confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good, society
would be the loser. Admissions of guilt resulting from valid
Miranda waivers "are more than merely 'desirable'; they are
essential to society's compelling interest in finding,
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law."
If the Miranda right to counsel can
be invoked at a preliminary hearing, it could be argued, there
is no logical reason why it could not be invoked by a letter
prior to arrest, or indeed even prior to identification as a
suspect.
The same reasoning applies to the appellant's
argument here. We reject the appellant's Article 38.22 argument.
Point of error one is overruled.
III. Admissibility of Penitentiary Packet
In point of error two, the appellant claims
the trial court erred in admitting his "pen packet," labeled
State's Exhibit 133, at the punishment phase. He specifically
objects to the omission of the required seal on the
certification page, which is required by Article 42.09 Section
8(b).
The Texas Department of Criminal Justice
shall not take a defendant into custody under this article until
the designated officer receives the documents required by
Subsections (a) and (c) of this section. The designated officer
shall certify under the seal of the department the documents
received under Subsections (a) and (c) of this section. A
document certified under this subsection is self-authenticated
for the purposes of Rules 901 and 902, Texas Rules of Criminal
Evidence.
The appellant's pen packet was certified by
affidavit of the Chairman of Classification and Records for the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice -- Correctional
Institutions Division, under the seal of the State of Texas,
instead of the seal of the Department.
The appellant contends that this seal was
insufficient to meet the statutory requirement for certification.
He argued at punishment that Article 42.09, Section 8, should be
the controlling procedure. Because that procedure was not
followed, he submits, State's Exhibit 133 is not self-authenticating
under Rules 901 and 902 and therefore should not have been
admitted.
We need not address whether the seal on
State's Exhibit 133 complies with the requirements of Article
42.09 because this procedure is not the exclusive means of
admitting a pen packet. Rather, it is one of several possible
ways of authenticating the document as a precondition to its
admission into evidence.
At the punishment hearing, the trial court
relied on
Barker v. State
(30)
in overruling the appellant's objection that the pen packet was
not self-authenticated, referring to the Barker court's
finding that Article 42.09 is not the sole method of
authenticating this type of document. In Barker, the
appellant had objected to the admission of his pen packets under
Article 42.09, Section 8(b), claiming they were inadequately
certified by the records clerk instead of by the director.
(31)
The trial court overruled his objection and admitted the
documents.
(32) The
appeals court agreed with the state's position that the
documents met the requirements of Rule 902(4) for self-authentication
and were not admitted in error.
(33) In so
holding, the Court reasoned:
We could interpret section 8(b) to require
the actual director's signature for admission of this particular
class of public documents, when every other similar class would
only have to meet the broader and easier requirements of Rule
902(1) through (4). We cannot imagine that this was the intent
of the legislature in enacting section 8(b).
Rather, it is quite plausible that section
8(b)'s requirement is one automatic vehicle for admission that
the legislature enacted to provide a sure-fire method of
admission, but not an exclusive one. This seems the reasonable
interpretation, while the interpretation of exclusivity seems
the absurd one.
(34)
We find the Barker reasoning
persuasive, and therefore hold that Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 42.09, Section 8(b), is not the exclusive means of
authenticating a pen packet.
In the instant case, the Chairman of
Classification and Records at TDCJID, in his affidavit,
certified that the pen packet contained "true and correct copies
of the original records" that were on file in his office and
maintained in the regular course of business. The affidavit
bears the seal of the State of Texas.
This certification provides sufficient
evidence to support a finding that State's Exhibit 133 is what
its proponent claims it to be, and thus the pen packet was
properly authenticated under Rule 901. State's Exhibit 133 also
satisfies the requirements for self-authentication under Rule
902(4) ("Certified Copies of Public Records"). It is a copy of a
public record, certified as correct by the custodian, by
certificate complying with Rule 902(1) ("Domestic Public
Documents Under Seal").
Point of error two is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Delivered: June 27, 2007.
Do Not Publish.
*****
1. See Code Crim.
Proc. art. 37.071, 2(b), (e), (g).
3. When the appellant was
arrested, Article 15.17(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
read, "In each case enumerated in this Code, the person making
the arrest or the person having custody of the person arrested
shall without unnecessary delay . . . take the person arrested
or have him taken before some magistrate . . . . The magistrate
shall inform in clear language the person arrested . . . of the
accusation against him and of any affidavit filed therewith, of
his right to retain counsel, of his right to remain silent, of
his right to have an attorney present during any interview with
peace officers or attorneys representing the state, of his right
to terminate the interview at any time, and of his right to have
an examining trial. The magistrate shall also inform the person
arrested of the person's right to request the appointment of
counsel if the person cannot afford counsel. The magistrate
shall inform the person arrested of the procedures for
requesting appointment of counsel. . . . The magistrate shall
also inform the person arrested that he is not required to make
a statement and that any statement made by him may be used
against him. The magistrate shall allow the person arrested
reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall,
after determining whether the person is currently on bail for a
separate criminal offense, admit the person arrested to bail if
allowed by law." Act of June 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch.
1281, 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3074, 3075; Act of June 14, 2001,
77th Leg., R.S., ch. 906, 4, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1800, 1801.
30. 931 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.
App. -- Fort Worth 1996).
31. Id., at 348
(At the time of the trial in Barker, Article 42.09
required the "director," rather than a "designated officer"
allowed under the current statute, to certify these documents).
Background: Following affirmance of his conviction in Texas
state court for capital murder, and after denial of his state
petition for postconviction relief, state prisoner filed petition
for writ of habeas corpus. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas, No. 6:09–CV–39, denied the
petition, and declined to issue a certificate of appealability (COA).
Prisoner filed application for COA with Court of Appeals.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals held that: (1) prisoner's Fifth
Amendment rights were not violated at police interrogation, and
(2) prisoner waived Sixth Amendment argument. Application denied.
CURIAM:
John Manuel Quintanilla, Jr., was charged in Texas state court
with the murder of Victor Billings. The jury found Quintanilla
guilty of murder committed in the course of committing or
attempting to commit a robbery—a capital offense—and the state
court judge sentenced him to death based on the jury's verdict on
the issues of punishment. Quintanilla petitioned unsuccessfully
for post-conviction relief in state court. He filed a habeas
petition in federal district court, which the district court
denied in all respects and dismissed. The district court sua
sponte declined to issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”).
Quintanilla has filed an application for a COA to this court on
two grounds: (1) whether his confession was obtained in violation
of the Fifth Amendment and therefore improperly admitted at trial;
and (2) whether his confession was obtained in violation of the
Sixth Amendment and therefore improperly admitted at trial. We
deny Quintanilla's application on both grounds.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The details of the murder giving rise to this case and the
factual circumstances surrounding Quintanilla's confession are
memorialized in opinions by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
Quintanilla v. State, No. AP–75061, 2007 WL 1839805 (Tex.Crim.App.
June 27, 2007) (unpublished) (slip op.), and the federal district
court, Quintanilla v. Thaler, No. 09–CV–39, 2011 WL 284353 (S.D.Tex.
Jan. 25, 2011) (slip op.). We do not repeat them here. In short,
Quintanilla was arrested on January 14, 2003, on a warrant for an
aggravated robbery unrelated to the instant offense. At 2:30 p.m.
on January 15, 2003, Quintanilla was taken before a magistrate for
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.17 proceedings and
warnings, which included informing Quintanilla that he had the
right to request the appointment of counsel and the right not to
make a statement and that all statements he made would be used
against him. Quintanilla requested appointed counsel at the
Article 15.17 hearing.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on the same day, Quintanilla was
interrogated without counsel regarding his charged robbery offense
by Victoria County Sheriff's Office Investigator Abel Arriazola
and Calhoun County Sheriff's Department Investigator Mike Kovorek.
Prior to beginning the videotaped interview, the investigators
gave Quintanilla his Miranda warnings, including notifying him of
his right to counsel and right to remain silent, both of which
Quintanilla waived. The investigators took a break at
approximately 7:55 p.m., and Quintanilla and Kovorek returned at
approximately 8:10 p.m. Kovorek then left, and at around 8:35
p.m., Arriazola returned with Victoria Police Department
Detectives Alfred Santiago and Tom Copeland. Arriazola told
Quintanilla that “Nothing has changed from the time I've talked to
you,” apparently meaning that his rights were still in effect, and
Santiago and Copeland were apparently aware that Quintanilla had
been Mirandized at the beginning of his interview. Santiago and
Copeland then interrogated Quintanilla, including asking questions
about the capital murder with which Quintanilla was not yet
charged. About fifteen minutes into the interrogation the
detectives reminded Quintanilla of his Miranda rights, which
Quintanilla again waived. Quintanilla subsequently made
inculpatory statements regarding the capital murder.
After a pre-trial hearing, the state trial court judge
determined that Quintanilla's statements made during his
interrogation about the aggravated robbery offense had been
obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
which Quintanilla invoked when he requested counsel at the Article
15.17 hearing. The trial judge also ruled that Quintanilla had
freely waived his Fifth Amendment rights to court-appointed
counsel and to be silent at the custodial interrogation, and that
the Sixth Amendment violation related to the aggravated robbery
charge did not prohibit the admission of statements Quintanilla
made regarding other then-uncharged offenses, including the
instant capital murder offense. Quintanilla was convicted by a
jury of capital murder and sentenced to death. He timely appealed
his conviction and sentence in state court, and sought habeas
relief in state court and in federal district court. This
application for a COA timely followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),
a petitioner can appeal a district court's dismissal of a habeas
petition only if the district or appellate court issues a COA. 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c); see also Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
335–36, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). Because the
district court sua sponte declined to issue a COA, Quintanilla
must seek a COA from this court to obtain further review of his
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); see also Coleman v. Quarterman,
456 F.3d 537, 541 (5th Cir.2006). We will issue a COA if
Quintanilla can make “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right” by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists
would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484,
120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). At this stage, our inquiry
“is a threshold inquiry only, and does not require full
consideration of the factual and legal bases of [Quintanilla's]
claim.” Neville v. Dretke, 423 F.3d 474, 482 (5th Cir.2005).
Because Quintanilla was sentenced to death, “we must resolve any
doubts as to whether a COA should issue in his favor.” Martinez v.
Dretke, 404 F.3d 878, 884 (5th Cir.2005).
In determining whether reasonable jurists would debate the
district court's assessment of Quintanilla's claims, we keep in
mind that the district court's decision must be made pursuant to
AEDPA's deferential standards. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274,
282, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004); see also Leal v.
Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 548 (5th Cir.2005). AEDPA permits a federal
district court to grant relief only if the state court decision
(1) “ ‘was contrary to’ federal law then clearly established” by
Supreme Court precedent, Harrington v. Richter, ––– U.S. ––––, 131
S.Ct. 770, 785, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1)), or (2) “ ‘involved an unreasonable application of’
such law,” id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), or (3) “ ‘was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts' in light of
the record before the state court,” id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2)).
A decision is contrary to federal law if it is “opposite to
that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law” or if it
resolves a case differently from the way the Supreme Court has “on
a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 412–13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A
decision unreasonably applies federal law when it “identifies the
correct governing legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases but
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state
prisoner's case.” Id. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A state court
decision also unreasonably applies federal law if it “either
unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court]
precedent to a new context where it should not apply or
unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context
where it should apply.” Id. “The state court's findings of fact
are entitled to a presumption of correctness and the petitioner
may overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing
evidence.” Leal v. Dretke, 428 F.3d 543, 548 (5th Cir.2005)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
III. ANALYSIS
Quintanilla argues in his application for a COA that the state
court unreasonably applied federal law on two grounds: first, that
his confession to capital murder was obtained in violation of his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel and therefore improperly admitted
at trial; and second, that his confession was obtained in
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and therefore
improperly admitted at trial. We address each issue in turn.
A. Fifth Amendment Right To Counsel
In his petition for a COA, Quintanilla argues that the Article
15.17 hearing before the magistrate—at which he was informed of
and exercised his right to court-appointed counsel—invoked his
Fifth Amendment rights in addition to his Sixth Amendment rights
as found by the state trial court. Because the Fifth Amendment
right to counsel is not offense-specific, Quintanilla argues that
he was illegally interrogated about the instant offense without
counsel notwithstanding his subsequent waiver of his Miranda
rights during the interrogation itself. The Fifth Amendment, which
applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653
(1964), provides that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend.
V. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966), the Supreme Court “declared that an accused has a
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
481, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The Miranda Court
adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect's
Fifth Amendment right from the “inherently compelling pressures”
of custodial interrogation: specifically, that “police officers
must warn a suspect prior to questioning that he has a right to
remain silent, and a right to the presence of an attorney.”
Maryland v. Shatzer, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1219, 175
L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010). The Court defined “custodial interrogation”
as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
Quintanilla undeniably was not subject to “custodial
interrogation” at the time he appeared before the magistrate at
the Article 15.17 hearing. Indeed, he concedes that the magistrate
“was not going to interrogate him” and that he was not subject to
questioning by law enforcement officers until approximately two
hours after his appearance before the magistrate. Rather,
Quintanilla argues that his request for counsel at the hearing
invoked his Fifth Amendment right to be free from any future
custodial interrogations without the presence of counsel. The
Supreme Court has held, however, that an accused's request for
counsel at an initial appearance on a charged offense does not
constitute an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181–82, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115
L.Ed.2d 158 (1991).
Quintanilla's argument—that the Article 15.17 hearing is
“basically to Mirandize the accused” and is “more than” a
preliminary hearing such that his Fifth Amendment rights
attached—is without merit and made without a shred of legal
support. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically held that
Texas's Article 15.17 hearing and initial appearance before a
magistrate is a preliminary hearing that invokes the
offense-specific Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Rothgery v.
Gillespie Cnty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 171
L.Ed.2d 366 (2008).FN1 Simply put, the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel did not attach at the Article 15.17 hearing because
Quintanilla was not then subject to custodial interrogation. FN1.
The Supreme Court has also explicitly rejected the argument that
an accused can “combine” the Sixth and Fifth Amendment rights to
counsel and that the prior invocation of the offense-specific
Sixth Amendment right voids all subsequent Fifth Amendment waivers
at the time of custodial interrogation on unrelated offenses. See
McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204.
It is undisputed that Quintanilla was given his Miranda
warnings by law enforcement officers before they interrogated him,
and that he waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel at that
time. Quintanilla has therefore neither made a substantial showing
that his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was denied, nor has he
demonstrated that reasonable jurists could disagree with the
district court's determination that Quintanilla did not invoke the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel during the Article 15.17 hearing.
B. Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
“The Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] ... is offense specific.
It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does
not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after
the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether
by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment.” Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167–68,
121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S.
at 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204). Furthermore, “a defendant's statements
regarding offenses for which he had not been charged [are]
admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel on other charged offenses.” Id. at 168, 121 S.Ct.
1335. FN2. “Even though the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
not attached to uncharged offenses, defendants retain the ability
under Miranda to refuse any police questioning.” Cobb, 532 U.S. at
172 n. 2, 121 S.Ct. 1335.
The state court held, and Quintanilla does not seek to
challenge, that (1) the Article 15.17 hearing constituted an
initial presentment that triggered Quintanilla's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel on the unrelated aggravated robbery offense, (2)
he exercised his right to counsel for that offense when he
requested an attorney during the hearing, and (3) the subsequent
interrogation by law enforcement officials regarding the robbery
without counsel present violated Quintanilla's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. In his application for a COA, Quintanilla argues
that his request for counsel on the robbery charge extended to the
then-uncharged offense of capital murder of which he was
eventually charged and convicted. Specifically, Quintanilla argues
that the charged and uncharged offenses were “so inextricably
intertwined” or “extremely closely related” that the invocation of
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on the robbery charge also
attached to the instant (then-uncharged) offense. See United
States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743 (5th Cir.1991).FN3
FN3. Cooper has been abrogated by Cobb. See Gore v. Sec'y for
Dep't of Corr., 492 F.3d 1273, 1306 n. 73 (11th Cir.2007)
(explaining that Cooper's language purporting to provide for an
“inextricably intertwined”-uncharged-crimes exception to the rule
that the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific is unavailing because
the Court's decision in Cobb articulates a different standard: the
Sixth Amendment does not attach to an uncharged crime unless it
“has elements identical to those of the charged crime and would
require proof of no additional facts”).
While Quintanilla states that he made this argument before the
state trial court,FN4 he did not present this argument to the
district court below. In his petition for habeas corpus to the
district court, Quintanilla's fifth claim for relief argues that
he would not have confessed to the capital murder if he had been
timely appointed counsel as requested at the Article 15.17
hearing. His Sixth Amendment argument below was framed as one of
causation: had his Sixth Amendment right as to the aggravated
robbery charge not been violated and Quintanilla been appointed
counsel before the interrogation began, his attorney “would have
advised him to assert his Fifth Amendment right to silence, rather
than give a detailed account of a crime spree or admit to capital
murder.” This construction of Quintanilla's argument below is
further supported by Quintanilla's citation in his habeas petition
before the district court to United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364
(5th Cir.1998), and its “fruit of the poisonous tree” discussion
in the Fourth Amendment context. Id. at 368. FN4. Thaler disputes
that Quintanilla raised this argument before the state trial
court. Resolving this factual dispute is unnecessary for purposes
of deciding Quintanilla's application for a COA.
Nowhere in his petition for habeas corpus does Quintanilla cite
to Cooper or argue the robbery and the instant offense are
“inextricably intertwined” or “extremely closely related.” Because
this argument is not made in his application for habeas corpus, we
lack jurisdiction to grant a COA on this argument and the argument
is waived. See, e.g., Balentine v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 842, 848–49
(5th Cir.2010); Brewer v. Quarterman, 475 F.3d 253, 255 (5th
Cir.2006) (explaining appellate jurisdiction over an application
for a COA).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Quintanilla's application
for a COA. DENIED.