Defendant was convicted in the 204th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Mark Nancarrow, J., of double capital murder, and death was imposed. On automatic direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals, Mansfield, J., held that: (1) defendant suffered no harm and was not deprived of qualified counsel, despite trial court's failure to comply with statutory requirement that it post qualifications for appointed counsel who represent defendants accused of capital murder and list of qualified attorneys; (2) regardless of whether defendant's arrest was illegal, he could not claim violation of any legitimate, reasonable expectation of privacy as result of search and seizure of vehicle in which he was passenger or other occupants; (3) police had satisfactory proof to believe that occupants of car they were pursuing had just committed double murder/robbery and that escape was imminent, and thus warrantless arrest of defendant, who had been in car, was justified; (4) trial court has discretion to decide whether state must voice both challenge for cause or peremptory challenge before defendant, or that both sides issue any challenges for cause before state first lodges peremptory challenge; (5) trial court's refusal to conduct in camera examinations of individual jurors after allegations surfaced that state engaged in improper jury communications was not abuse of discretion; (6) defendant was not entitled to relief based on complaint that state failed to provide timely notice of intent to introduce evidence of unadjudicated, extraneous offense, at punishment stage; and (7) defendant was not entitled to proposed instruction submitted during punishment stage, which would have ordered jury to disregard evidence connecting defendant with unadjusted, extraneous murder. Meyers, J., concurred in the result with note. Johnson, J., concurred in result.

MANSFIELD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which McCORMICK, P.J., KELLER, PRICE, HOLLAND, WOMACK, and KEASLER, J.J., joined.

Appellant, Tommie Collins Hughes, was charged with capital murder committed in Dallas County on or about August 13, 1997. See Tex. Pen.Code § 19.03(a)(2). Appellant was accused of shooting and robbing two women in the parking lot of a theater in north Dallas.

A jury found appellant guilty, and its answers to the special punishment issues necessitated that a sentence of death be imposed by the trial court. Art. 37.071, §§ 2(b)(1), (e), & (g). [FN1] Direct appeal to this Court is automatic pursuant to Article 37.071, § 2(h). Appellant presents fourteen points of error for this Court's consideration, and we shall address the points of error as they occurred at trial.

Considered as a whole, the particular facts of this case, as they were elicited by the State at trial, demonstrate there was satisfactory proof that a crime had been committed and that the individuals arrested shortly after the crime occurred were responsible.

The theater where the crime occurred had experienced a rash of robberies and burglaries in the recent past, and law enforcement officers had staked out the area with specific hopes of catching those responsible.

During the evening in question, undercover officers noticed appellant and his partner, Michael English, as the two walked through the parking lot toward the theater building.

Approximately ten minutes later, both men were observed walking quickly back toward their car, a Mercury Tracer. Appellant was twenty to thirty feet behind English. English appeared to be hunched over, concealing what was described as a "large bulge" beneath his shirt. This "bulge" had not been observed earlier.

After both men entered the car, the driver, who had never left the vehicle, quickly accelerated, exiting the parking lot at a high rate of speed, and continued onto the highway reaching speeds of ninety miles an hour. To the undercover officers, these actions, under the existing circumstances, indicated the two men may have just burglarized a parked motor vehicle. One officer, in an unmarked vehicle, began a clandestine pursuit, maintaining a safe distance so as not to arouse the suspect's suspicion.

The officers remaining at the theater searched the parking lot for signs of a possible burglary. Within minutes, theater patrons came upon the two victims, both apparently dead of gunshot wounds. Authorities were notified, and the occupants of the Mercury Tracer then became capital murder suspects.

By viewing the totality of the circumstances, there was satisfactory proof that a crime had been committed and the occupants of the Mercury Tracer were responsible. See Dejarnette v. State, 732 S.W.2d at 351.

We determine now whether there was satisfactory proof that appellant was about to escape, and there was insufficient opportunity to obtain an arrest warrant. Information of the crime and its possible suspects was immediately dispatched over the police radio.

The undercover officer kept the speeding Mercury Tracer within his sight until a marked police unit intervened and occupied a position directly behind, and within obvious view of, the fleeing vehicle. The officer did not, however, activate the unit's emergency lights at this time. The suspect vehicle eventually exited the highway and pulled into a gas station in south Dallas.

Appellant exited and appeared as though he was preparing to activate the gas pump. The pursuing unit pulled in behind the suspect vehicle, activated its emergency lights, and, almost immediately, other marked units converged on the scene. Appellant was ordered onto the ground and arrested. The remaining occupants of the car were ordered to exit the vehicle, and they, too, were placed under arrest.

In points of error eleven and twelve, appellant claims a myriad of state and federal constitutional violations "because of the impossibility of simultaneously restricting the jury's discretion to impose the death penalty while also allowing the jury unlimited discretion to consider all evidence militating against imposition of the death penalty." To support his position, appellant quotes extensively from Justice Blackmun's dissent in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 114 S.Ct. 1127, 127 L.Ed.2d 435 (1994). This argument, too, has been addressed and overruled by this Court. See, e.g., Shannon v. State, 942 S.W.2d 591, 600 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (Texas capital sentencing scheme does not create the paradoxical commands of concern to Justice Blackmun); Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 826, 117 S.Ct. 88, 136 L.Ed.2d 44 (1996). We overrule the eleventh and twelfth points of error. Appellant's final two points of error contend the "cumulative effect" of these alleged constitutional violations denied him due process and due course of law as guaranteed by the Texas and United States constitutions. Having found no constitutional violations, however, no "cumulative" harm could have occurred. Points of error thirteen and fourteen are overruled.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Hughes v. Dretke, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2004 WL 549480 (N.D.Tex. 2004) (Habeas)