FURGESON, J.
Petitioner Richard Hinojosa filed this federal habeas corpus action pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 seeking review of his July, 1997 Bexar County conviction for capital murder and his sentence of death.

I. Synopsis

As grounds for relief, petitioner argues that (1) the prosecution suppressed exculpatory and impeachment evidence in violation of the rule in Brady, (2) the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony to secure petitioner's conviction, (3) petitioner's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (a) failing to adequately prepare for and rebut the prosecution's DNA evidence, (b) inadequately examining potential jurors during voir dire and accepting as jurors members of the venire who were likely biased against petitioner, (c) admitting during jury argument that petitioner was the source of the semen found inside the victim, (d) failing to present evidence rebutting the prosecution's shoe print evidence, (e) failing to request jury instructions at the guilt-innocence phase of trial regarding the lesser-included offense of murder, requiring unanimity regarding the method of capital murder, and the definition of “same criminal episode,” (f) failing to present mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of trial regarding petitioner's difficult, abused, childhood, (g) failing to present failure DNA evidence, (h) failing to present favorable shoe print evidence, (i) failing to voir dire the prosecution's DNA expert, and (j) failing to object to the trial court's characterizations of the presumption of innocence, (4) petitioner was constructively denied effective assistance of trial counsel, (5) the trial court committed fundamental error in combining different factual theories of capital murder in the guilt-innocence phase jury charge, (6) various terms employed in the punishment phase jury instructions were unconstitutionally vague, and (7) Texas statutes forced petitioner's jurors to continue deliberating after they had reached a verdict favorable to petitioner.

For the reasons set forth hereinafter, petitioner is entitled to neither federal habeas corpus relief from this Court nor a Certificate of Appealability.

II. Statement of the Case

A. Factual Background

1. The Crime and its Aftermath

On the morning of May 10, 1994, Terry Wright was reported missing. Family members and police officers who arrived at her residence found a flower pot had been thrown through a window and her bedroom in a shambles.FN2 Muddy footprints led from the broken window into Ms. Wright's bedroom, where a torn nightgown was discovered.FN3 Both Ms. Wright and her vehicle were missing.FN4 The telephone line to Ms. Wright's residence had been cut. FN5

A footprint was observed in the mud in the atrium outside the house, directly adjacent to the broken window.FN6 Later that same date, Ms. Wright's vehicle was discovered in an inoperable condition in a relatively isolated location a short distance from her residence.FN7 That evening, law enforcement officers aided by a K-9 unit located Ms. Wright's nude body lying in a field near where her vehicle had been discovered.FN8

A shoe print found near where Ms. Wright's body was located matched the shoe print found just outside the broken window of Ms. Wright's home.FN9 The shoe prints matched the out-sole of a brand and model of tennis shoes purchased by petitioner's wife several months before Terry Wright's murder.FN10

FN9. A San Antonio Police Sergeant testified regarding the discovery of the foot print at the crime scene. See S.F. Trial, Volume 17, testimony of Jeffrey Humphrey, at pp. 73, 85, 95, 142, 153. A different San Antonio Police Officer testified that me made plaster casts of the foot prints located at both Mr. Wright's residence and the location where her body was discovered. See S.F. Trial, Volume 17 of 24, testimony of Crisoforo Vieyra, at pp. 199, 203, 205-06, 208-09; and Volume 18 of 24, testimony of Crisoforo Vieyra, at pp. 6-7 & 11.

A tool mark expert testified that the sole patterns found on the shoe prints found at Terry Wright's residence and near where her body was discovered were a match. See S.F. Trial, Volume 18 of 24, testimony of Richard Stengel, at pp. 108 & 112-14. A photograph of the shoe print found at the location near Terry wright's body was admitted into evidence at petitioner's trial as State Exhibit No. 37 and appears at S.F. Trial, Volume 24 of 24, at pp. 98-99.

FN10. Petitioner's ex-wife testified at petitioner's trial that (1) in he months prior to Terry wright's murder, she purchased herself and petitioner matching pairs of FILA tennis shoes that were identical except for the fact that petitioner's pair were slightly larger than her pair, (2) after Terry Wright's murder, she was unable to locate petitioner's tennis shoes, and (3) she furnished law enforcement investigators with her pair of tennis shoes, which were identical, except for size, to the pair she had purchased petitioner prior to the murder. See S.F. Trial, Volume 18 of 24, testimony of Rebecca Alfaro, at pp. 71-74, 77-78, 80, 82, 92, & 101.

A representative of FILA testified that (1) all models of the men's and women's versions of the FILA “slant shot” tennis shoes in question bore the same sole pattern, (2) the only difference between the men';s and women's models of that tennis shoe were the size of the shoe, with women's models having a much narrower out-sole, especially in the ball of the foot, and (3) in his opinion, the shoe prints found at Terry Wright's home and at the location where her body was discovered were made by men's shoes. See S.F. Trial, Volume 17 of 24, testimony of John A. Kivlehan, at pp. 158-65, 169, & 171.

An autopsy revealed both that Terry Wright had been stabbed eleven times in her chest and back and the presence of sperm in her vagina.FN11 Subsequent testing of the DNA recovered from the sperm found inside Terry Wright identified petitioner as the probable source of that sperm.FN12

FN11. See S.F. Trial, Volume 18, testimony of Vincent DiMaio, at pp. 187-208 & 211-13. The medical examiner testified that (1) five of the stab wounds penetrated the heart and were all potentially fatal, (2) another stab wound penetrated a lung and was also potentially fatal, (3) there did not appear to be any defensive wounds on Ms. Wright's body, and (4) the pattern of the wounds suggested that her heart had been the target of Ms. Wright's attacker. Id., at pp. 194-96, 203, 211-13, & 222.

FN12. More specifically, a Bexar County serologist testified that initial DNA testing, using the Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (“RFLP”) method, proved inconclusive so samples were sent off to a private laboratory for more sophisticated DNA testing. See S.F. Trial, Volume 19 of 24, testimony of Lonnie Ginsberg.

The representative of the private DNA-testing laboratory which conducted more sensitive Polymerase Chain Reaction (“PCR”) analysis of the sperm recovered from Terry Wright's vagina testified that (1) petitioner's DNA was a match for the sperm-DNA recovered from Terry Wright, (2) statistically, the odds of petitioner's DNA randomly matching all the DNA characteristics of the DNA revealed by the PCR testing of the sperm fraction of Terry Wright's vaginal swabs were one in nineteen million, nine hundred thousand, (3) there was no indication in their test results that the sperm found inside Terry Wright had come from multiple sources, and (4) there was no indication of contamination in their test results. See S.F. Trial, Volume 19, testimony of Meghan Clement, at pp. 58-77, 86, & 97-98.

2. The Indictment

On August 15, 1995, a Bexar County grand jury indicted petitioner in cause no. 95-CR-4325 on a single Count of capital murder. The indictment charged, in four separate paragraphs, that, on or about May 10, 1994, petitioner intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Terry Wright by stabbing her with an object unknown to the grand jury while in the course of committing and attempting to commit the predicate felony offenses of burglary, kidnaping, robbery, and aggravated sexual assault upon Mr. Wright, respectively. The facts and evidence elicited during petitioner's capital murder trial are discussed at length in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' published opinion affirming petitioner's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See Hinojosa v. State, 4 S.W.3d 240, 242-45 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

3. The Trial

The guilt-innocence phase of petitioner's capital murder trial commenced on July 14, 1997. On July 21, 1997, the jury returned its verdict, finding petitioner guilty of capital murder.FN14 FN14. See Statement of Facts from petitioner's trial (henceforth “S.F. Trial”), Volume 21 of 24, at pp. 99-102; and Trial Transcript, Volume II of II, at p. 210.

The punishment phase of petitioner's capital murder trial began and ended on July 25, 1997, at the conclusion of which the state trial court sentenced petitioner to death by lethal injection.FN15 FN15. See S.F. Trial, Volumes 23 of 24, at pp. 53-56; Trial Transcript, Volume II of II, at pp. 224-25.

Testimony and documentary evidence, including court records, admitted during the punishment phase of petitioner's capital murder trial established that petitioner had previously been convicted of multiple counts of assault and robbery, as well as for voluntary manslaughter arising from an incident in which the petitioner shot his victim in the chest and then ran up and shot the victim a second time in the back of the head. See S.F. Trial, Volume 22 of 24, testimony of Richard Contreras, at pp. 6-7 & 9; testimony of Beatrice Gonzales, at pp. 12, 15, 17, & 19; testimony of Vincent DiMaio, at pp. 23-27; and State Exhibit Nos. 99-103, found at S.F. Trial, Volume 24 of 24, at pp. 194-306.

In response to two special issues, petitioner's jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) there was a reasonable probability petitioner would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society and (2) taking into consideration all the evidence, there were insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a sentence of life imprisonment. See Trial Transcript, Volume II of II, at pp. 224-25.

4. Direct Appeal

Petitioner appealed. In an opinion issued October 27, 199, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence.FN16 Petitioner did not seek certiorari review of his conviction or sentence on direct appeal from the United States Supreme Court. FN16. See Hinojosa v. State, 4 S.W.3d 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

5. State Habeas Corpus Proceeding

On July 20, 1999, petitioner filed an application for state habeas corpus relief, asserting all of the arguments outlined in Section I above.FN17 The state trial court held an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's state habeas corpus claims on March 7-8, 2000. In an Order issued August 23, 2000, the state trial court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that petitioner's request for state habeas corpus relief be denied.FN18 On January 31, 2001, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued an unpublished Order denying petitioner state habeas corpus relief based on the trial court's findings.FN19

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D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

1. Overview of the Arguments

In his third claim for relief, petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance to petitioner by (1) failing to adequately prepare for, rebut, and present DNA evidence, (2) failing to adequately voir dire and exercise peremptory challenges against biased members of the jury venire, (3) admitting during jury argument that petitioner could have been the source of the semen recovered from terry Wright's body, (4) failing to elicit favorable testimony from Alfaro and the prosecution's shoe print expert regarding the size of the running shoes the defense introduced at trial, (5) failing to object to and request jury instructions and definitions at the guilt-innocence phase of trial, and (6) failing to present mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of trial.

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This aspect of petitioner's multi-faceted ineffective assistance claim fails to satisfy either prong of Strickland. Petitioner's trial co-counsel testified without contradiction during petitioner's state habeas corpus hearing that (1) petitioner informed him that petitioner had engaged in a consensual sexual liaison with Terry Wright shortly before her murder, (2) based on that information, said counsel argued to the jury that the presence of petitioner's semen inside Terry Wright's body did not establish that petitioner had sexually assaulted Wright, (3) in further support of this position, said counsel introduced the testimony of witnesses at the guilt-innocence phase of trial who had seen petitioner and Wright socializing together on previous occasions, and (4) said counsel did not believe it was in petitioner's best interests to allow petitioner to testify at the guilt-innocence phase of trial because such testimony would have opened the door to impeachment of petitioner through admission of evidence regarding petitioner's prior criminal convictions. FN127

Based upon the information related to said counsel by petitioner, the decision by petitioner's trial counsel to address the presence of petitioner's semen inside Terry Wright's body through argument and evidence suggesting petitioner had engaged in a consensual sexual liaison with Wright shortly before her murder falls well within the broad parameters of objectively reasonable professional performance. Thus, these complaints do not satisfy the first prong of Strickland.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection on the merits of petitioner's complaints about his trial counsel's alleged deficiencies vis-a-vis the guilt-innocence phase jury instructions was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the petitioner's state trial and habeas corpus proceedings.

f. Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence

Finally, petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to discover, develop, and present available mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of petitioner's trial showing that petitioner (1) had a family history of parental abuse, including physical violence and emotional isolation, (2) lacked stability in his marital relationships, (3) rarely attended church, and (4) had a family history that included depression, suicide, and mental illness.FN140 FN140. See Petition, at pp. 71-73 & 95-96.

During the punishment phase of petitioner's capital murder trial, his trial counsel presented several of petitioner's family members and a family friend who made emotional appeals for mercy on petitioner's behalf and attempted to show petitioner in a sympathetic light.FN141 Petitioner's trial counsel also presented testimony from two jail detention officers establishing that petitioner had been a model prisoner during his pretrial detention.FN142

FN141. More specifically, three of petitioner's sisters each (1) made an emotional appeal for mercy for petitioner and (2) testified that petitioner had done poorly in school due to his dyslexia and had not graduated from high school. See S.F. Trial, Volume 22 of 24, testimony of Lisa Pecina, at pp. 38-41; testimony of Linda Carroll, at pp. 42-44; and testimony of Irene Hernandez, at pp. 45-46. Petitioner's sister Lisa Pecina also explained during her testimony that the petitioner had been married and divorced four times and had fathered six children. Id., testimony of Lisa Pecina, at p. 40-41.

Petitioner's older brother (1) made an emotional plea for mercy on petitioner's behalf, (2) testified that the oldest brother in their family, Gregory, had been shot and killed in 1972, (3) testified that when his young daughter, who shared a birthday with petitioner, died in 1988, the petitioner told him that he would never celebrate his birthday again. Id., testimony of Ruben Hinojosa, at pp. 47-50. A family friend, who testified that she had known petitioner for nine years, also made an emotional plea for mercy on petitioner's behalf. Id., testimony of Elizabeth Casillas, at pp. 51-52.

FN142. See S.F. Trial, Volume 22 of 24, testimony of Robert Falcon, at pp. 56-57; testimony of Robert Cannon, at pp. 61-63. On cross-examination, both of these detention officers admitted they were unaware that petitioner had been cited for possessing a razor blade, a violation of jail rules. Id., testimony of Robert Falcon, at p. 58; testimony of Robert Canon, at p. 64.

During his state habeas corpus hearing, petitioner offered no testimony from the lone member of his defense team identified by co-counsel as solely responsible for the punishment phase of petitioner's trial.FN143 Nor did petitioner offer any testimony establishing precisely what information regarding petitioner's background was actually in the possession of his trial counsel during the punishment phase of petitioner's trial.FN144

Instead, petitioner presented testimony from one of petitioner's sisters establishing that (1) their early childhood was characterized by a home in which a lot of screaming and shouting occurred, (2) their father, who was in the military, was emotionally distant, played no role in their education, and dispensed corporal punishment in an abusive manner, repeatedly whipping petitioner with a belt, once breaking a golf club over petitioner's back, once firing a gun into the kitchen ceiling in anger at petitioner, and, on another occasion, binding and hanging petitioner from a tree for an extended period of time, (3) their mother threw dinner, boiling water, and a kitchen knife at petitioner and, on other occasions, whipped petitioner with a coat hanger, a broom, a belt, shoes, or whatever was handy, (4) petitioner suffered from depression, never really learned to communicate, rarely attended church, and had several unstable marital relationships, (5) their entire family was devastated by the death of petitioner's niece, (6) petitioner's uncle, who had spent most of his adult life in mental institutions, committed suicide, (7) their oldest brother, with whom petitioner was close, was shot and killed at a bar, (8) she fought often with petitioner from age seven to twelve, (9) petitioner was married and divorced four times, fathered six children, and engaged in numerous extramarital affairs, (10) on one occasion, their mother directed petitioner to beat another child with a board so as not to appear weak, and (11) petitioner graduated from neither grade school nor high school and nor earned a GED. FN145

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Viewed in proper context, there is no basis for disagreement among jurists of reason with regard to this Court's disposition of any of petitioner's claims herein, at least some or which are barred by the non-retroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane. All of the evidence petitioner claimed the prosecution withheld from his trial counsel was either readily available to petitioner through the exercise of due diligence or of such meager evidentiary value as to fail to satisfy the materiality standard of Brady.

Furthermore, far from being unaware of Rebecca Alfaro's prior inconsistent statements regarding petitioner's FILA tennis shoe's sole patterns, petitioner's trial counsel effectively employed Alfaro's prior inconsistent statements to impeach her at trial.

More importantly, it was the testimony of FILA company representative John Kivlehan and the prosecution's tool mark expert, not Alfaro's testimony, which linked a pair of men's FILA “slant shot” tennis shoes to both crime scenes. There has never been any evidence suggesting the prosecution knowingly employed any false testimony to secure petitioner's conviction.

The state habeas court's conclusion that all of petitioner's ineffective assistance claims failed to satisfy both prongs of Strickland is not subject to disagreement among reasonable jurists. Petitioner made little effort to allege, much less prove, prejudice in support of most of his claims of ineffective assistance. Finally, well-settled Supreme Court precedent directly forecloses each of petitioner's final four claims for relief herein.

Under such circumstances, petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of Appealability with regard to any of his claims for relief herein. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. 2. All relief requested in petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition, filed July 16, 2001,is DENIED. 3. Petitioner is DENIED a Certificate of Appealability.