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William
Jay GOLLEHON
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics: Riot
Number of victims: 7
Date of murder:
1985 / September 2, 1990 / September
22, 1991
Date of birth: ???
Victims profile:
A woman / Gerald Pileggi (fellow inmate) / Five inmates
Method of murder:
??? / Beating with a baseball
bat
Location: Montana, USA
Status:
Sentenced to 130 years in prison in 1986. Sentenced to death in
1992. Sentenced to 30 years in prison and
five concurrent terms of life imprisonment in 1993
William Jay. Gollehon was sentenced to death
in 1992 after he and Douglas Turner fatally beat fellow inmate Gerald
Pileggi with a baseball bat at the Montana State Prison in 1990.
Mr. Gollehon, who was already serving a 130-year
sentence for killing a Billings woman in 1985, recently had an appeal
denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. Mr. Gollehon also is serving time
for his role in the 1991 riot at the prison.
Supreme Court of Montana
State v. Gollehon
864 P.2d 1257 (1993)
STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. William Jay GOLLEHON, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 93-066.
Submitted on Briefs September 23, 1993.
Decided December 7, 1993.
Byron Boggs, Missoula, William F. Hooks, Appellate Defender, Helena,
for defendant and appellant
Joseph P. Mazurek, Atty. Gen., John P. Connor, Jr.,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, for plaintiff and respondent
TRIEWEILER, Justice.
Defendant William Jay Gollehon was charged in the
District Court for the Third Judicial District in Powell County with
two counts of kidnapping by accountability, one count of burglary, and
five counts of deliberate homicide. Following a seven-day jury trial
in Bozeman, Montana, Gollehon was convicted of all charges and was
subsequently sentenced by the District Court. Gollehon appeals from
his convictions. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1. Did the District Court err when it denied
defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of burglary?
2. Did the District Court err when it denied
defendant's motion to dismiss the five counts of deliberate homicide?
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when
it admitted into evidence autopsy photographs of the victims?
4. Did the District Court err when it denied
defendant's motion for mistrial on the basis of juror misconduct?
5. Did the State's destruction of certain physical
evidence deny defendant his constitutional right to due process of
law?
On the morning of September 22, 1991, William Jay
Gollehon and eight other Montana State Prison inmates gained access
to, and took control of, the maximum security unit of the prison. When
officers regained control of the building four hours later, five
protective custody inmates had died as a result of the riot that
Gollehon and others participated in.
The maximum security building is divided into two
separate areas. "A Block," "B Block," and "C Block" are located on the
west side of the building. "D Block," "E Block," and "F Block" are
located on the east side. Control cages are located on each side of
the building. The west control cage regulates the power to A, B, and C
Blocks, and the east control cage regulates the power to D, E, and F
Blocks. Centered between the two units of the building are six
separate exercise yards. At the time of the riot, there were ten
protective custody inmates housed on D Block, and a total of 68
inmates in the maximum security building. Gollehon was one of the
maximum security inmates housed on C Block.
During the morning of September 22, 1991, thirteen inmates, including
Gollehon, were in the exercise yards. While officers were returning
some of the inmates from the exercise yards to their cells, Gollehon
and eight other inmates broke through the wire fences separating the
exercise areas and eventually gained access to the section of the
maximum security building leading to A, B, and C Blocks. Once inside
the building, the inmates were able to reach both control cages and
ultimately were able to open the doors to all of the blocks in the
maximum security unit.
While the inmates had control of the building, five officers took
refuge by locking themselves in a shower facility in C Block. The
inmates threatened to burn the officers out of the shower if they did
not release keys to other sections of the building. The officers
complied, and then heard the inmates say they were going to go to D
Block and "get" the protective custody inmates. The officers remained
in the shower until they were released by other officers after the
riot.
Two protective custody inmates who were working outside their cells
took refuge by barricading themselves in the laundry room. The rioting
inmates, including Gollehon, tried unsuccessfully to break down the
door and to smoke them out of the laundry room by starting a fire. At
one point, not expecting to survive the attack, one of the inmates
wrote the names of the inmates who were trying to get at them on the
side of the dryer. Gollehon's name was included. Unable to get at the
inmates in the laundry room, the rioting inmates entered D Block,
opened the cells, and proceeded to kill five of the protective custody
inmates.
On February 3, 1992, Gollehon was charged in an
eight count information with two counts of kidnapping by
accountability in violation of §§ 45-2-302 and 45-5-302, MCA; one
count of burglary in violation of § 45-6-204, MCA; and five counts of
deliberate homicide in violation of § 45-5-102(1)(b), MCA.
Gollehon filed motions to dismiss the burglary and
homicide charges on the grounds that the burglary statute was not
applicable to the facts of the case and that the homicide counts,
based on the felony murder theory, would, therefore, necessarily fall.
This motion was denied.
He also filed a motion to produce various items of
physical evidence, including the clothing that he was wearing at the
time of the alleged offenses and the clothing of the other inmates of
the maximum security unit. That motion was denied for the reason that
the State had destroyed the clothing and much of the personal property
of the inmates after the riot.
Gollehon was convicted of all charges following a jury trial. He was
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on each count of kidnapping, and 20
years on the count of burglary, all of which were to run
consecutively. He was sentenced to five concurrent terms of life
imprisonment on the deliberate homicide convictions, to run
consecutively with the sentences imposed for kidnapping and burglary,
and the sentences already being served for prior offenses. From this
judgment, Gollehon appeals.
I.
Did the District Court err when it denied defendant's motion to
dismiss the charge of burglary?
The burglary charge was based on the allegation that Gollehon had
"knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in an occupied structure,
the D block area of the maximum security unit, with the purpose to
commit an offense therein, namely, Riot." Section 45-2-101(40), MCA,
defines occupied structure as follows: "Occupied structure" means any
building, vehicle, or other place suitable for human occupancy or
night lodging of persons or for carrying on business, whether or not a
person is actually present. Each unit of a building consisting of
two or more units separately secured or occupied is a separate
occupied structure. [Emphasis added].
Gollehon contends that the court should have
dismissed the burglary charge on the basis that the definition of
occupied structure is inapplicable to his unauthorized entry into D
Block. He asserts that the maximum security unit is one single
building, and that no sections of the building constitute a separate
occupied structure apart from the remainder of the unit. As a matter
of law, he contends that he could not be charged with burglary for
entering D Block during the September 1991 riot.
When reviewing a trial court's interpretation of
the law, the standard of review employed by this Court is whether the
court correctly interpreted the law. Steer, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 803 P.2d 601. In this instance, the
court concluded that the burglary statute was applicable because the
definition of "occupied structure" encompassed the D Block of the
maximum security unit. After considering the express language of the
statute in question, and the circumstances of this case, we conclude
that the court correctly interpreted the statute and did not err when
it denied Gollehon's motion to dismiss the burglary charge.
The language used in § 45-2-101(40), MCA, defining occupied structure
is plain and unambiguous. It clearly states that each unit of a
building which consists of two or more separately secured units is a
separate occupied structure. The maximum security unit is a building
consisting of several "blocks" which are physically distinct and are
separately secured. Moreover, each block consists of separately
secured cells which are intended for human occupancy. The plain
language of the statute clearly contemplates that a burglary can occur
within parts of a building when one unlawfully enters or remains
within a separately secured unit within that building. The
unauthorized entry by Gollehon and the other rioting inmates into D
Block of the maximum security unit fits squarely within the burglary
statute. When statutory language is plain, unambiguous, direct, and
certain, a court cannot apply any other means of interpretation.
White v. White (1981), 195 Mont. 470, 636 P.2d 844.
Gollehon claims that this interpretation of the statute is contrary to
the provisions of § 45-1-102(1)(c), MCA, which requires that the
definition of an offense provides "fair warning of the nature of the
conduct declared to constitute an offense." He notes that the Powell
County District Court records reveal that no prisoner has ever been
charged with burglary for unauthorized entry into another area of the
prison, but here, without fair warning that he could be charged in
this manner, he stands convicted of five counts of homicide by virtue
of the State's unprecedented application of the burglary statute. He
contends that the burglary statute does not state that it specifically
applies to prisons and that if the Legislature intended it to apply to
the State Prison it could have expressly so stated. Without such a
statement, he asserts the inference must be drawn that such an
application of the statute was not intended.
Montana's burglary statute does not enumerate specific structures or
types of buildings to which it applies. Rather, the statute refers to
an "occupied structure" which, in turn, is generally defined. Because
the statute is general in nature, it is inconsistent to suggest that a
structure satisfying the definition of an occupied structure cannot be
the site of a burglary unless it is specifically enumerated. Even
though no prisoners have previously been charged with burglary for
conduct occurring within the prison, the language of the statute is
clear and provides fair notice to all persons of conduct which
constitutes the criminal offense of burglary.
Gollehon also argues that the prison handbook, which describes
internal institutional rules, does not warn inmates that an inmate's
presence in an unauthorized area of the prison could result in a
charge of burglary in district court. The prison's orientation
handbook does not serve as an exclusive list of offenses for which an
inmate can be charged in court. The prison handbook warns inmates to
follow all "city, county, state, and federal laws," and the internal
disciplinary procedures established by the prison do not exempt
inmates from compliance with the laws of the State of Montana.
Gollehon urges this Court to reject the application of the burglary
statute to this situation due to the unique circumstances which exist
in a prison. Because prisoners are required to be in certain
authorized areas only and are not allowed the same liberties that the
general population enjoys, he contends that different concepts must be
employed when an inmate ventures into unauthorized areas of the
prison.
The law provides that a person is liable for burglary only when he or
she unlawfully enters an occupied structure with the purpose to
commit an offense therein. Section 45-6-204(1), MCA. The fact that
an inmate may be in an unauthorized area of the prison does not, by
itself, constitute a burglary. However, if he or she enters that area
for the purpose of committing an offense, an inmate should be as
liable as anyone else for the consequences of that act. Although this
Court has not previously addressed burglary in the context of a
correctional facility, our decision is consistent with the holding in
People v. Pringle (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), 465 N.Y.S.2d 742, in
which a New York court addressed a similar situation. After
considering language in the burglary statute defining "building" as a
structure consisting of "two or more units separately secured or
occupied," that court held that a nurse's station within a prison was
a "building" for purposes of the burglary statute. The factor deemed
decisive was that the nurse's station was an independent unit within
the prison building with its own secure entrance. Pringle, 465
N.Y.S.2d. at 743. Here, D Block is similarly an independent area of
the maximum security unit which is separately secured. Because
Gollehon entered that area for the purpose of committing an offense,
we conclude that he is appropriately chargeable with burglary.
We hold that the District Court correctly concluded that Gollehon
could be charged with burglary for his unauthorized entry into D Block
during the September 1991 riot.
II.
Did the District Court err when it denied
defendant's motion to dismiss the five counts of deliberate homicide?
As a result of the deaths which occurred during the
riot, Gollehon was charged with five counts of deliberate homicide
pursuant to § 45-5-102(1)(b), MCA, which is Montana's "felony-murder
rule." That statute provides, in relevant part, that a person commits
the offense of deliberate homicide if, during the course of the
commission of burglary, "he or any person legally accountable for the
crime causes the death of another human being."
Gollehon contends that the court should have dismissed the homicide
charges because he was improperly charged with burglary, and
therefore, there was no underlying felony upon which to base the
homicide charges. Since we have held that the burglary charge was
proper, we conclude that this argument is without merit.
The District Court did not err when it denied the motion to dismiss
the deliberate homicide charges.
III.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it
admitted into evidence autopsy photographs of the victims?
During the trial, the State introduced 20 color
photographs taken by the medical examiner during the autopsies of the
five victims. Gollehon contends that the court abused its discretion
when it admitted these graphic photographs into evidence because their
prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value. It is his
contention that the photographs had little probative value because
there was no dispute that the homicides had occurred, nor was there a
dispute about the identity of the victims, the position of their
bodies, or the nature or location of the injuries or causes of death.
The standard of review of evidentiary rulings is whether the district
court abused its discretion. State v. Crist (1992), 253 Mont.
442, 833 P.2d 1052. The court has broad discretion to determine
whether or not evidence is relevant and admissible, and absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination
will not be overturned. Crist, 833 P.2d at 1054.
When considering whether photographs should be admitted as evidence at
trial, the court must determine whether their probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403,
M.R.Evid.; State v. Henry (1990), 241 Mont. 524, 788 P.2d 316.
Here, the State contends that the photographs were offered to prove
the means by which the victims were killed and to corroborate the
testimony of other inmates who described what they heard or saw
occurring in D Block. Although the photographs were very graphic
depictions of the assaults committed against the victims, the State
notes that they were only exhibited during the State Medical
Examiner's testimony and the jury was not allowed to take these
photographs into deliberations.
In this instance, the court concluded that the probative value of the
photographs was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
After considering the evidence in question, we are aware that the
photographs depict the brutality and viciousness of the crimes
committed. However, we do not believe that they would have aroused the
jurors' passions any more than other evidence of Gollehon's conduct.
As we stated in State v. Doll (1985), 214 Mont. 390, 400, 692
P.2d 473, 478, "[w]e will not demand that a trial be sanitized to the
point that important and probative evidence must be excluded." We,
therefore, hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
when it admitted the autopsy photographs into evidence.
IV.
Did the District Court err when it denied
defendant's motion for mistrial on the basis of juror misconduct?
In the course of the trial of this matter, a brief conversation
occurred among one, or possibly two, jurors and a correctional officer
who was providing security at the courthouse and who had testified
earlier in the trial. After the presiding judge was notified of the
conversation, Gollehon moved for a mistrial due to juror misconduct.
The officer was questioned in chambers and he testified that the
conversation concerned the Montana State University football team. He
stated that the conversation occurred when two persons were waiting
outside the courtroom near his security post, and that he did not
realize they were members of the jury. Based on this testimony,
Gollehon's motion was denied.
On appeal, Gollehon contends that the court
improperly denied this motion, and that it erred by not examining the
jurors in addition to the security guard. He asserts that the
discussion among the jurors and a witness constituted juror misconduct
which gives rise to a presumption of prejudice to Gollehon. The burden
is then on the State to rebut this presumption, and testimony of the
juror(s) is the appropriate method to determine if prejudice resulted.
Here, because the State did not examine the jurors, he contends there
was no evidence to rebut the presumption of prejudice and the court
improperly denied his motion.
The standard of review for reversing a lower court's denial of a
motion for mistrial requires clear and convincing evidence that the
trial court's ruling was erroneous. State v. Gambrel (1990),
246 Mont. 84, 803 P.2d 1071; State v. Salois (1988), 235 Mont.
276, 766 P.2d 1306. Because the trial court is in the best position to
observe the jurors and determine the potential for prejudice when
allegations of jury misconduct are raised, the court has significant
latitude when ruling on these matters, and its determination is given
considerable weight by this Court. State v. Eagen (1978), 178
Mont. 67, 582 P.2d 1195.
Citing this Court's holding in Eagen where we stated that jury
misconduct tending to injure the defendant creates a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice, Gollehon contends that a presumption of
prejudice remains in this case because the State failed to examine the
jurors and relied only on the testimony of the security guard.
However, we have recently made clear that the burden of rebutting a
presumption of prejudice shifts to the State "only after there has
been a threshold showing of misconduct which injures or
prejudices the defendant." State v. McNatt (1993), 257
Mont. 468, 472, 849 P.2d 1050, 1052-53. In this instance, we find no
initial showing that the conversation resulted in prejudice against
Gollehon. The conversation was a brief, casual interchange right
outside the courtroom doors, and these circumstances do not suggest a
degree of impropriety which would have warranted examining those
jurors or declaring a mistrial. The District Court was in the best
position to evaluate the incident, and in the absence of a showing of
prejudice, we will defer to the court's determination that the alleged
jury misconduct did not entitle Gollehon to a mistrial. We conclude
that the court's denial of the motion for mistrial was not clearly
erroneous.
V.
Did the State's destruction of certain physical evidence deny
defendant his constitutional right to due process of law?
When prison officials regained control of the maximum security unit on
September 22, 1991, all of the inmates who had participated in the
riot were required to strip and immediately leave the building. Prior
to trial, Gollehon's counsel requested that certain items of physical
evidence, including the clothing worn by the maximum security inmates,
be produced for inspection. The State responded to this discovery
request by stating that the inmates' clothing had been destroyed after
the riot. The State noted that, contrary to defense counsel's
understanding, clothing issued to maximum security inmates had no
identifying marks which would allow it to be traced to any particular
inmate.
On appeal, Gollehon asserts that he was denied a
fair trial because the State failed to produce what could have been
powerful exculpatory evidence for his defense. It is his contention
that the absence of blood on his clothing would have established that
he had not engaged in the struggles with the inmates who were killed
and that the State's destruction of this evidence resulted in
substantial prejudice to him.
The State first argues that Gollehon failed to properly raise this
issue at the trial court level because no motion to dismiss was made.
Therefore, the State asserts that this issue is waived on appeal.
After considering the circumstances of this case, however, and the
fact that rulings in regard to the production of this evidence were
made during the trials of the other rioting inmates, we conclude that
Gollehon's motion in limine sufficiently preserved the issue for
consideration by this Court.
However, after reviewing the record, we do not find that the
destruction of the inmates' clothing provides a basis for reversing
Gollehon's conviction. This Court has made clear that a criminal
defendant has a right to obtain exculpatory evidence, but his right is
personal and does not require that police officers take initiative or
even assist in procuring evidence on behalf of a defendant. State
v. Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63, 79, 805 P.2d 537, 546. Although
the denial of one's right to obtain exculpatory evidence is a
violation of due process, a defendant must show a deliberate or
intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence in order to claim a
per se violation of due process. Sadowski, 805 P.2d at 547.
Furthermore, there must be a showing that the evidence in question
meets the test for constitutional materiality as adopted in State
v. Halter (1989), 238 Mont. 408, 777 P.2d 1313:
Whatever the duty the Constitution imposes on the State to preserve
evidence,
that duty must be limited to those that might be expected to play a
significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of
constitutional materiality ... evidence must both possess an
exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed,
and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.
Halter, 777 P.2d at 1316 (quoting California v. Trombetta
(1984), 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2534, 81 L.Ed.2d 413,
422).
In this instance, there is no showing that the
clothing was destroyed with the knowledge of its potential exculpatory
value or with the intent of deliberately suppressing valuable
evidence. It is clear that the objective of ordering the inmates to
strip was to get the unit under control and to restrain the rioting
inmates from further violence. Even if Gollehon had been able to
establish the absence of blood on his clothing, this would not
necessarily have vitiated his accountability for the deaths of the
inmates during the riot according to the statute with which he was
charged.
We conclude that the destruction of the clothing does not constitute a
deliberate suppression of valuable exculpatory evidence and Gollehon
was, therefore, not constitutionally deprived of his right to due
process.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
TURNAGE, C.J., and HARRISON, GRAY, HUNT, NELSON and
WEBER, JJ., concur.
