On appeal, Fitzgerald raises four claims: (1) that he was denied a fair and impartial jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) that the Commonwealth failed to provide exculpatory information as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that he was parole ineligible in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (4) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

Before we address Fitzgerald's claims, we must determine the applicable standards of review. Because Fitzgerald filed his federal habeas petition after enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA's more deferential standards of review apply to his claims. The AEDPA provides:

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West Supp.1998). We recently interpreted subsection (1) to prohibit the issuance of the writ unless (a) the state court decision is in "square conflict" with Supreme Court precedent which is controlling as to law and fact or (b) if no such controlling decision exists, "the state court's resolution of a question of pure law rests upon an objectively unreasonable derivation of legal principles from the relevant supreme court precedents, or if its decision rests upon an objectively unreasonable application of established principles to new facts." Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, (4th Cir. 1998). "In other words, habeas relief is authorized only when the state courts have decided the question by interpreting or applying the relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable." Id. We now turn to the merits of Fitzgerald's claims.

A.

Fitzgerald contends that James Bradshaw's presence on his jury deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Fitzgerald relies upon two bases for his claim. First, he asserts that Bradshaw's failure to disclose certain relevant information during voir dire denied him the opportunity to strike Bradshaw for cause. Second, Fitzgerald contends that even if Bradshaw's voir dire responses were truthful, Bradshaw's statement during sentencing deliberations that he had no sympathy for a rapist demonstrates his bias against Fitzgerald. For the reasons that follow, we decline to grant Fitzgerald relief.

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to an impartial jury is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). The Supreme Court has held that due process requires "a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

In cases alleging juror dishonesty during voir dire, we apply the two-part test enunciated in McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), in determining whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial. In McDonough, the Court held

that to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. The motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial.

446 U.S. at 556, 100 S.Ct. 1870.

Failure to satisfy the requirements of McDonough does not end the court's inquiry, however, when the petitioner also asserts a general Sixth Amendment claim challenging the partiality of a juror based upon additional circumstances occurring outside the voir dire. As Justice Blackmun emphasized in his concurrence in McDonough, "the Court's holding [did] not ... foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury." Id. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass'n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir.1997); Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 985 (10th Cir.1996). Justice Blackmun explained that

regardless of whether a juror's answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias, or in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.

McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57, 104 S.Ct. 845 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (holding that "the remedy for allegations of jury partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias"); cf. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (holding that the defendant bears the burden of establishing juror partiality).

Turning to the specific facts of this case, we find that during voir dire, the trial court asked Bradshaw if "[he] or any member of [his] immediate family [had] been the victim of a rape, robbery, or abduction?" Bradshaw answered "no." (J.A. at 29-30.) The court later asked him if he knew of any reason that he could not give Fitzgerald a fair trial based solely upon the evidence presented and the law. Bradshaw agreed that he could render a fair verdict. Bradshaw subsequently was seated on the jury.

At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury voted to convict Fitzgerald of all charges, including the two capital murder charges. The penalty phase of the trial followed, after which the jury began its sentencing deliberations. The jury first unanimously agreed to recommend the death penalty for the two murder convictions and then began voting on all the other sentences. Upon arriving at the last conviction, the abduction and rape of Tiffany Lovelace, Bradshaw disclosed to the jury that he had no sympathy for rapists because his granddaughter had been molested as a child. He then made a motion that the jury impose a life sentence upon Fitzgerald for the rape of Tiffany Lovelace. The motion failed, however, and the jury imposed a forty-year sentence for the crime.

Some time after the jury announced its verdict and sentences but before the trial court imposed its sentence, the jury foreman reported the Bradshaw incident to the court. The trial court immediately conducted a post-trial hearing at which time both counsel and the court questioned Bradshaw regarding his partiality.² At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court, satisfied that Fitzgerald suffered no prejudice from Bradshaw's presence on the jury, denied Fitzgerald's motion for a mistrial.

On direct appeal, Fitzgerald argued that he was denied an impartial jury because Bradshaw misled defense counsel when he deliberately failed to disclose that his granddaughter had been "touched in the wrong way" at the age of fourteen, thereby denying counsel the opportunity to strike him for cause. See Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 299, 455 S.E.2d 506, 511 (1995). The Virginia Supreme Court rejected Fitzgerald's claim. The court concluded that Bradshaw "testified truthfully during the voir dire. No one asked Bradshaw during voir dire whether his granddaughter had been molested. Rather, he was asked whether any member of his immediate family had been raped." Id. at 511-12.

Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, we will presume the correctness of the state court's finding that Bradshaw's responses during voir dire were not only honest, but factually accurate. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1). Because Fitzgerald has failed to present any evidence to the contrary, we will not disturb the state court's factual determination. As a result, Fitzgerald has failed to satisfy the McDonough test.³

To the extent that Fitzgerald asserts a general Sixth Amendment claim of juror bias in addition to a McDonough claim based upon allegations of juror dishonesty, this claim is also without merit. "[T]he remedy for allegations of jury partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias." Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940. As noted above, that was precisely the procedure followed in this case. The trial court afforded Fitzgerald an unfettered opportunity to uncover any juror bias during a post-trial hearing. Bradshaw unequivocally stated, however, that his granddaughter's molestation had no effect on his voting to convict or sentence Fitzgerald for any of his crimes. (J.A. at 639-40.)

Apparently conceding that he failed to demonstrate actual bias during the post-trial hearing,⁴ Fitzgerald urges this Court to imply Brad shaw's bias based upon the record before us. See Smith, 455 U.S. at 221, 102 S.Ct. 940 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that "implied bias" also may provide a basis for relief under certain circumstances); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936) ("The bias of a prospective juror may be actual or implied; that is, it may be bias in fact or bias conclusively presumed as matter of law."). Assuming that implied bias remains a viable doctrine post-Smith, we decline to invoke it in this case. Cf. Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir.1988) (questioning the viability of the implied bias doctrine); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir.1990) (acknowledging that "[t]he Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted or rejected the doctrine of implied bias").

"[T]he doctrine of implied bias is limited in application to those extreme situations where the relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is such that it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in his deliberations under the circumstances." Person, 854 F.2d at 664. As examples of the "exceptional" and "extraordinary" situations that might require a finding of implied bias, Justice O'Connor cited "a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction." Smith, 455 U.S. at 222, 102 S.Ct. 940 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This is not such an egregious situation. Neither Bradshaw nor anyone in his family was personally connected to any of the parties in this case. The circumstances of this case simply do not give rise to a presumption of bias.

Furthermore, even if we conclude that Bradshaw's presence on the jury was error, the principles of comity, federalism, and finality prevent us from overturning Fitzgerald's convictions and sentence, unless we are convinced that "the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the ... verdict,' " Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)), or entertain grave doubt that it had such an effect, see O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S.Ct. 992, 995, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995) (holding that when "the record is so evenly balanced that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error" he should resolve the doubt in favor of the petitioner and grant relief). Following the Supreme Court's precedents, see Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), this Court has repeatedly examined instances of juror misconduct and bias for harmlessness. See Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 422 (4th Cir.1997) (en banc) (jury's exposure to ex parte communication from prosecutor's office found harmless when the communications were "nothing more than innocuous interventions" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 22, 1998) (No. 97-9263); United States v. Seeright, 978 F.2d 842, 849-50 (4th Cir.1992) (juror's independent investigation of evidence did not require a mistrial when judge excused juror from further service and satisfied himself that other jurors were not affected); Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743-46 (4th Cir.1988) (jury's exposure to improper third-party contact examined to determine extent of prejudice); United States v. Malloy, 758 F.2d 979, 982-83 (4th Cir.1985) (juror's previous service at trial of co-defendant did not require a new trial); Miller v. Harvey, 566 F.2d 879, 881 (4th Cir.1977) (jury's improper experiment, in which one juror bit another to observe the resulting bruises, did not violate due process and thus did not require granting a writ of habeas corpus). Thus, we must determine whether Bradshaw's presence on the jury had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710.

At the time of Bradshaw's statement, the jury had already voted to convict Fitzgerald on all counts and unanimously had agreed to recommend the death sentence for the murders of White and Morrison. In fact, the jury had agreed to all of Fitzgerald's sentences except the rape charge when Bradshaw stated that he had no sympathy for a rapist and recommended that Fitzgerald receive a life sentence for the rape of Tiffany Lovelace. The jury declined to adopt Bradshaw's recommendation and instead imposed a forty-year sentence for the crime. Also, during the post-trial hearing, Bradshaw stated unequivocally that his granddaughter's experience did not affect his voting to convict or sentence Fitzgerald. Based upon the foregoing circumstances, combined with the overwhelming evidence of Fitzgerald's guilt, his propensity for future dangerousness, and the vileness of his crimes, we are confident that Bradshaw's presence on the jury did not result in actual prejudice to Fitzgerald. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (holding that an error does not have a substantial and injurious effect on a jury verdict unless "it resulted in 'actual prejudice' " to the habeas petitioner (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986))). Accordingly, Fitzgerald is not entitled to federal habeas relief.

B.

Fitzgerald next maintains that the Commonwealth failed to provide exculpatory information as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny. Specifically, Fitzgerald claims that the Commonwealth failed to disclose that Girard Younger, who testified on behalf of the Commonwealth during both the guilt and sentencing phases, was a convicted felon working as an informant for the Commonwealth in other unrelated cases. Such evidence, he claims, could have been used effectively to impeach Younger.

On state habeas review, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Fitzgerald could have raised this issue on direct appeal, but did not, and therefore dismissed the claim as procedurally defaulted under Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974). "Under federal habeas law, we are not at liberty to question a state court's application of a state procedural rule because a state court's finding of procedural default is not reviewable if the finding is based upon an adequate and independent state ground." Williams v. French, 148 F.3d 203, 209 (4th Cir.1998) (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038). A state procedural rule is adequate if it is regularly or consistently applied by the state court, see Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988), and is independent if it does not "depend[ ] on a federal constitutional ruling," Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). The rule set forth in Slayton constitutes an adequate and independent state ground for the denial of habeas relief. See, e.g., Mu'min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 438, 139 L.Ed.2d 337 (1997); Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1194 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 553, 136 L.Ed.2d 424 (1996). Therefore, absent cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to excuse the procedural default, we may not review Fitzgerald's claim because the state court declined to consider its merits upon the basis of an adequate and independent state procedural rule. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989).⁵ Because Fitzgerald does not attempt to establish cause and prejudice or actual innocence to excuse his default, we do not consider whether either exists. See Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642, 656 n. 10 (4th Cir.1998) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 19, 1998) (Nos. 97-9198 & 97-9264).⁶ Consequently, the district court correctly found Fitzgerald's claim defaulted.

C.

Fitzgerald next contends that he was denied the opportunity to inform the jury regarding his ineligibility for parole in accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994).

During the penalty phase of Fitzgerald's trial, defense counsel requested that the following instruction be given to the jury:

The court instructs the jury that under Virginia Law any person convicted of three separate felony offenses of murder, rape or robbery by the presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon or any combination of the offenses of murder, rape or robbery when such offenses were not part of a common act, transaction or scheme shall not be eligible for parole.

(J.A. at 668.) The trial court denied the motion. In reliance upon Simmons, Fitzgerald challenged the trial court's denial on direct appeal. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected Fitzgerald's claim, concluding that (1) parole eligibility in Virginia is a question of law to be determined by the judge, not the jury, and (2) as a matter of law, Fitzgerald would have been eligible for parole because his crimes were part of a common act. See Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 299, 455 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1995). As a result, the Virginia Supreme Court found that Simmons was inapplicable to the case.

Simmons holds only that a state deprives a defendant in a capital case of due process if it "conceal[s] from the sentencing jury the true meaning of its noncapital sentencing alternative, namely, that life imprisonment mean[s] life without parole." 512 U.S. at 162, 114 S.Ct. 2187. Under Virginia law, however, "Fitzgerald was not parole ineligible" and so a life sentence would not have meant life without parole. Fitzgerald, 455 S.E.2d at 510.⁷ Because the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Simmons, we reject Fitzgerald's claim.

D.

Finally, Fitzgerald asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing and for failing to fully investigate and present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. Fitzgerald also contends that he is entitled to relief because his appellate counsel failed "to raise valid issues on appeal." (Petitioner's Br. at 27.) On state habeas review, the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed all Fitzgerald's ineffectiveness claims for lack of merit. We conclude that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to the facts presented.

Strickland provides that a petitioner must demonstrate both that his trial counsel's representation was deficient and that he was prejudiced thereby. See id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 421 (4th Cir.1997) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 22, 1998) (No. 97-9263). In making this determination, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To demonstrate prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In the context of challenging a death sentence, "the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

1.

Fitzgerald claims that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a competency examination after learning that Fitzgerald was "experiencing suicidal ideation, delusional thought processes, and auditory hallucinations" before trial. (Petitioner's Br. at 24.) As the district court noted, however, on May 14, 1994, the trial court ordered that Fitzgerald be evaluated for competency and sanity at the time of the offense. This evaluation was performed by Dr. C. Robert Showalter. Subsequently, in July 1993, the court appointed Dr. Thomas V. Ryan, a clinical neuropsychologist, to evaluate Fitzgerald. Dr. Ryan reported that Fitzgerald was borderline mentally retarded, but that he understood the roles of the participants in the criminal trial process and was not insane. Nothing in either Dr. Showalter's or Dr. Ryan's reports suggested that Fitzgerald was not competent to stand trial. In his affidavit, trial counsel stated that he decided that requesting another competency examination would be futile in light of the existing reports and counsel's and the court's own experiences with Fitzgerald.⁸ Counsel further testified that he found Fitzgerald to be helpful and cooperative and that Fitzgerald actively participated in his own defense, in particular during jury selection. Based upon the foregoing, we cannot say that counsel was deficient in failing to move for an independent competency evaluation.

2.

Fitzgerald further contends that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to present mitigating witnesses during the sentencing phase of the trial. Specifically, Fitzgerald asserts that there was significant mitigating evidence demonstrating Fitzgerald's troubled mental state during his pretrial incarceration. While Fitzgerald fails to identify any witnesses to this Court or produce any affidavits from these purported witnesses, he apparently is referring to two individuals that allegedly reported him as delusional, suicidal, and hallucinatory while incarcerated. To the extent that we can review this claim, we hold that counsel's decision not to present these witnesses was reasonable. First, counsel was entitled to rely upon Dr. Ryan's assessment that Fitzgerald was sane and competent to stand trial and, therefore, counsel's decision not to present additional witnesses was not unreasonable. Second, as the district court noted, counsel's strategy to focus their case on Fitzgerald's social and educational history, rather than his alleged mental problems in jail, was credible and, therefore, should not be second-guessed. See Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354, 1364 (4th Cir.1991) (recognizing that "[t]he best course for a federal habeas court is to credit plausible strategic judgments" when evaluating ineffectiveness claims).

3.

Fitzgerald also argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to brief a claim that Fitzgerald's sentence was excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Fitzgerald's attorneys stated in their brief that Fitzgerald "relies upon this Court's expertise in conducting the automatic review of the sentences of death imposed upon him which is required by Code § 17-110.1 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended, and chooses to make no argument relative to this assignment of error." Appellant's Brief at 19, Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 299, 455 S.E.2d 506 (1995) (Nos. 94-1426 & 94-1586). The Virginia Supreme Court reviewed Fitzgerald's sentence as mandated by § 17-110.1(E) of the Virginia Code and affirmed it. See Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 299, 455 S.E.2d 506, 512 (1995).

Counsel's strategic decision to selectively brief and argue what, in his professional judgment, were Fitzgerald's strongest claims does not render counsel constitutionally deficient under Strickland. See Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226, 1235 (4th Cir.1985) (holding that "appellate counsel has no constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to raise such issue on appeal" (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983))).

Moreover, Fitzgerald cannot demonstrate that counsel's actions prejudiced him in any way. First, this Court refuses to give credence to Fitzgerald's suggestion that the Virginia Supreme Court conducted a less than thorough review of his case due to his attorneys' decision to rely upon the court's mandatory review, rather than fully brief the issue. Second, and more decidedly, the failure to conduct a proportionality review, if proven, would not entitle Fitzgerald to habeas relief. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 103 F.3d 344, 351 (4th Cir.1996), cert. granted in part and aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998). As a result, we readily conclude that Fitzgerald was not prejudiced in any way by counsel's actions. In sum, we hold that the Virginia Supreme Court's dismissal of Fitzgerald's ineffective assistance of counsel claims was not an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's rulings in Strickland and its progeny.

Finally, Fitzgerald contends that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing. He claims that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he never received an evidentiary hearing in state court. We disagree.

Fitzgerald is entitled to an evidentiary hearing "only if the state court fact-finding process was deficient in some significant respect." Eaton v. Angelone, 139 F.3d 990, 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 2338, 141 L.Ed.2d 709 (1998) (No. 97-9170). In fact, "[e]videntiary hearings have never been required on federal collateral review of state petitioners' ineffectiveness claims." Id. at 995; see also Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 229 (4th Cir.1994) (upholding denial of habeas corpus on basis of trial counsel's affidavit). Moreover, that the state habeas court dismissed Fitzgerald's claims based upon affidavits does not render the proceeding less than full and fair. See Eaton, 139 F.3d at 995. Accordingly, we uphold the district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing.

In conclusion, we hold that Fitzgerald has failed to "ma[ke] a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c) (West Supp.1998). Consequently, we deny his motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss his petition.

DISMISSED.

*****

1

Adopting the jury's recommendations, the trial court also sentenced Fitzgerald to life imprisonment for the two robberies and the abduction and rape of Claudia White; two forty-year sentences for the abduction and rape of Lovelace; and a thirty-year sentence for the breaking and entering conviction