Missouri Inmate Executed For Two St. Louis Murders After Delay of 2 1/2 Hours

By Cordell Whitlock - KSDK-TV.com

May 18, 2005

(KSDK) - Convicted killer Vernon Brown was executed early Wednesday morning for committing two murders in the mid 1980's. Brown's attorney asked for clemency, claiming he was abused as a child and he was prone to drug induced blackouts as an adult. That clemency was denied.

But at 11:56 pm Tuesday night, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a temporary stay on the execution. At 2:10 am that stay was lifted and the execution went ahead as planned.

Vernon Brown had been behind bars since 1986. His victims' families waited a long time for this day. He was convicted in two murders, and suspected of several others.

"March 8th of 1985, my daughter was found murdered in her apartment," said Ann Ford. His first victim was 19 year old Synetta Ford. Brown eventually confessed to the crime, but only after he was arrested and then released on a technicality. "A year and seven months later, he killed little Janet Perkins," said Ford's mother.

Janet Perkins was on her way home from school when the attack happened. Brown lured the 9-year-old child into his house and strangled her. Police later found her body in a dumpster. Perkins' family has said that Brown is finally getting what he deserves after all these years. Suzanne Perkins says, "Yes, he is going to get executed. But it's not going to bring her back. It's not going to bring her back at all." Janet Perkins' family chose not to attend Brown's execution. They said it wasn't something they needed to see.

However, Synetta Ford's family said they wouldn't miss Wednesday's execution for the world. "I don't say that it means closure, because there will be no closure as long as I am alive. But it will be closure for him. It's just something I wanted to see since my daughter was found."

State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1995) (PCR- Perkins Murder).

Defendant was convicted before the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Evelyn M. Baker, J., and was sentenced to death. Subsequently, the Circuit Court, Robert G. Dowd, Jr., J., overruled defendant's postconviction motion, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Robertson, J., held that: (1) trial court did not err in overruling motion to strike venireperson for cause; (2) court did not err in finding defendant's minor stepsons competent to testify against him; (3) evidence was sufficient to support element of deliberation; (4) court did not err in denying continuance sought by defendant on ground that counsel needed time to prepare for evidence that state failed to timely disclose; and (5) imposition of death penalty was not excessive or disproportionate. Affirmed.

ROBERTSON, Judge.

A jury convicted Vernon Brown of first degree murder in violation of Section 565.020, RSMo 1994 and recommended that he be put to death. The trial court agreed and entered a sentence of death. Subsequently, the motion court overruled Brown's Rule 29.15 motion. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. The conviction, sentence and denial of post-conviction relief are affirmed.

We interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 455 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 837, 115 S.Ct. 118, 130 L.Ed.2d 64 (1994).

On October 24, 1986, nine-year-old Janet Perkins left the Cole School in north St. Louis around 3:00 p.m. and walked toward her home three and a half blocks away. She generally took the same route each day, west on Enright Avenue. Under normal circumstances, the trip took less than 15 minutes.

Vernon Brown, who was then using the name Thomas Turner, had picked up his stepsons from Cole School and returned to their home on Enright Avenue in time to see Janet walking past. Brown called to her and ultimately enticed her to enter the house.

Brown's stepsons saw Janet enter the house. A neighbor's relative saw Brown on the front porch and Janet walking up the steps to the house. Brown ordered the stepsons to their bedroom and locked the door from the outside. Despite Brown's claims *284 that at this point he began suffering PCP-induced blackouts, Brown's own statements, the testimony of his stepsons, and the physical evidence show that he took Janet to the basement of the house, and bound her feet and one hand with a wire coat hanger, forcing her into a crouched position that permitted her head to reach the height of Brown's genitalia. Brown then strangled Janet to death with a rope.

The next day, enforcement authorities found Janet's body in two trash bags near a dumpster in an alley behind Brown's house. Further investigation raised suspicion about Brown. When suspicion turned to probable cause, the police arrested Brown on October 27, 1986, confronted him with their evidence, including testimony of a neighbor who had seen Janet enter Brown's house, and asked Brown to tell them where to find Janet's missing shoe, raincoat and school papers. Brown led police to a different dumpster, in which they found a bag containing Janet's missing property.

Brown made a videotaped statement implicating himself as Janet's killer. In a subsequent statement, Brown also admitted killing Synetta Ford, a woman who had been murdered on March 7, 1985.

On November 18, 1986, a St. Louis City grand jury indicted Brown on two counts of first degree murder for the deaths of Janet Perkins and Synetta Ford. Brown's counsel moved to suppress the two videotaped statements and to sever the trials on the two murders. The trial court sustained the motion to sever but overruled the motion to suppress.

The jury convicted Brown of Janet Perkins' murder and, in the penalty phase, found four statutory aggravating circumstances and four nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. The jury recommended that Brown be put to death. The trial court concurred, entering its judgment of conviction and sentence of death on December 2, 1988. Subsequently, Brown filed a timely Rule 29.15 motion. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion court overruled the Rule 29.15 motion. This appeal followed.

A few preliminary matters require our attention. First, we choose to depart from Brown's presentation of the issues to proceed chronologically.

Second, Brown operates under several fundamental misconceptions about the proper subjects of a motion for post-conviction relief. He repeatedly assigns error to the motion court's refusal to order relief for acts or omissions which, if erroneous, would constitute simple trial errors subject to review on direct appeal. We will not address claims of motion court error founded on alleged trial court errors which appellant should have preserved for direct appeal.

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Brown initially contends that the trial court erred in finding his stepsons competent to testify against him, and in permitting the prosecutor to use leading questions in examining the boys. At the time of the trial, the stepsons, Tommy Johnson, Christopher Moore and Jason Moore, were ages eleven, nine, and seven, respectively.

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The trial began October 17, 1988, nearly two years after Janet's murder. The state endorsed Brown's stepsons as witnesses in the penalty phase on May 26, 1987. Two weeks prior to trial, the state furnished Brown a copy of a police report showing allegations that Brown had sodomized his stepsons. On October 10, 1987, the state informed Brown that it intended to use the sodomies as evidence of an aggravating circumstance at the penalty phase of the trial.

On October 14, 1987, Brown filed a motion for a continuance, claiming that he suffered a medical condition that would make it difficult for him to sit through trial and that he had only recently been provided the police report outlining Brown's sodomies against his stepsons. The trial court denied the continuance.

On October 14, 1988, the state provided Brown with statements of various witnesses from Indianapolis, Indiana, surrounding Brown's guilty plea to charges of assault and battery with intent to gratify sexual desire in Indiana in 1973. The victim of the Indiana felony was a 12-year-old female. Brown received a sentence of up to five years as a result of that conviction.

On October 18, 1988, the day after voir dire in the trial commenced, Brown filed a motion for sanctions to prevent the state from using the Indiana evidence or, in the alternative, for a continuance. The trial court overruled both motions. 2.

The state offered the evidence that Brown sodomized his stepsons in support of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. Brown now claims that the trial court erred in admitting the sodomy evidence, and in denying a continuance, on the ground that the state's failure to disclose its intent to prove the sodomy as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance deprived his counsel of time to prepare for that evidence.

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Dr. James Monteleone testified for the state during the penalty phase concerning the sodomy of Brown's stepsons in 1987. Monteleone's testimony showed that physical evidence corroborated the claims of Tommy Johnson and Jason Moore that Brown had sexually abused them. On cross-examination, Brown's counsel attempted to ask about a 1984 physical examination of the boys conducted at the request of their mother. The state objected on the ground of relevance. The trial court sustained the objection. Brown now claims trial court error in the decision to sustain the objection.

A 1987 police report provided Brown by the state indicated that the boys were examined at Cardinal Glennon Hospital in 1984 following a previous report of abuse. Brown offered no evidence in an offer of proof either that Dr. Monteleone participated in any examination of any of the children in 1984 or was aware of the 1984 examination.

It appears from the record and from Brown's brief that Brown's counsel's inquiry was an attempt to bring out a statement in the 1987 police report that the boys' mother paid no attention to Christopher's complaint that Vernon "was messing with him" because she believed "the children played, lied." [Emphasis added.] Dr. Monteleone's testimony of physical trauma to Tommy Johnson and Jason Moore's anuses rebutted the mother's statement as to the question of whether the sexual abuse actually occurred. The trial court did not err in sustaining the state's objection. The point is denied.

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Brown first insists that the Indiana conviction for assault and battery with intent to gratify sexual desires is not a "serious assaultive criminal conviction" within the meaning of Section 565.032.2(1) and the trial court erred in submitting it as a statutory aggravating circumstance. We disagree.

The Indiana indictment charged Brown with assault and battery by fondling a 12-year-old child in a "rude or insolent manner." Brown seizes on the words "rude or insolent" to argue that the Indiana assault was not also "seriously assaultive." Brown pled guilty to a felony in Indiana. By definition a felony is a "crime of a ... more serious nature than those designated misdemeanors." Black's Law Dictionary 617 (7th ed. 1990).

Obviously, an assault and battery to gratify sexual desires is an assault. To conclude, as Brown urges, that sexual assault of a child that results in a felony conviction is not seriously assaultive misunderstands the nature of the offense. Any felony assault and battery that constitutes a sexual invasion of a child is seriously assaultive within the meaning of Section 565.032.2(1).

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This Court finds the imposition of the death penalty in this case is not excessive or disproportionate. The judgments are affirmed.

State v. Brown, 958 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1997) (PCR- Ford Murder).

Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, Michael Godfrey and David Mason, JJ., of first-degree murder, and was sentenced to death. He appealed conviction and denial of postconviction relief. The Supreme Court held that defendant preserved for appeal his Batson claim. Remanded with directions.

PER CURIAM.

In 1991, appellant Vernon Brown was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. A motion for post-conviction relief was filed and overruled. . . . this case is remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the prosecutor used the state's peremptory strikes to remove members solely on the basis of gender. Upon completion of that hearing, the record of the proceeding shall be certified to this Court.

State v. Brown, 998 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1999) (PCR- Ford Murder).

Defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death filed motion for post-conviction relief. On remand from the Supreme Court, 958 S.W.2d 553, the Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, David Mason , J., denied motion. On consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court, Wolff , J., held that: (1) state's reasons for striking venirepersons were sufficiently race and gender-neutral to survive Batson challenge; (2) defendant was not entitled to individual voir dire and sequestration of jury during voir dire; (3) testimony of two witnesses that victim told them that she was afraid of defendant was relevant to victim's state of mind; (4) defendant's confession was not rendered involuntary, unintelligent, or unknowing because he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol; (5) finding that defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective was supported by evidence; and (6) defendant was not entitled to instruct jury on specific nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Affirmed.

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.

In 1991, appellant Vernon Brown (also known as Thomas Turner) was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. Brown filed a motion for post-conviction relief and the motion was overruled. Brown appealed to this Court. On September 12, 1997, this Court issued a per curiam remanding this case to the trial court for "gender-Batson hearing." State v. Brown, 958 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. banc 1997). On November 23, 1998, the hearing court held a gender-Batson hearing. After hearing, it rejected Brown's gender-Batson challenge. This Court has jurisdiction in Brown's consolidated appeal. Mo. Const. art. V, section 3. We affirm.

Facts

In 1986, Brown was charged by indictment with murder in the first degree. Brown and his wife, Kathy Moore, lived in an apartment at 3435 Washington in the City of St. Louis. Brown worked in that apartment complex as a maintenance worker, and he also worked next door at the Grand Cafe on Washington as a dishwasher. Brown and his wife moved to 4028 Enright after February 13, 1985. A few days later, the victim, Synetta Ford, moved into a basement apartment of the building at 3435 Washington. Ford's roommate was Alesia Brown.

On February 23 or 24, 1985, Alesia Brown, Synetta Ford, Earl Bedford and Vernon Brown played cards together in Ford's apartment. Bedford testified that Brown flirted with the victim, Ford, but she appeared not to be interested.

On February 28, 1985, Alesia Brown checked into a hospital for about ten days because she was pregnant. Prior to her admission into the hospital, Alesia had discussed with the appellant the possibility of him working on their apartment rug and vent. Brown went to the victim's apartment to take up the rug on March 2 nd and 4 th, but the victim told him to wait until her roommate, Alesia Brown, came back from the hospital.

On March 5, 1985, the victim called her friend, Vickie Noland, she spoke very fast, and she asked Noland to "come get me now." Ford told Noland that she was afraid because she came home and found Brown on the stairway near the entrance of her apartment. Noland picked Ford up at about 2:35 p.m., and she spent the night with Noland. The last time that Noland saw Ford was when Ford left for work, on the morning shift at Victor Foods, at about 4:30 a.m. the next morning.

Alesia Brown's brother, Anthony Brown, works with Ford at Victor Foods. Anthony Brown testified that he last saw Ford on Wednesday, March 6, 1985, between 3:30 p.m. and 3:45 p.m. at Victor Foods. He testified that he spent the night with Ford on Tuesday night at her apartment, and she had told him about her encounter with the maintenance person.

On March 7, 1995, at about 10:30 a.m., Brown arrived at the Grand Cafe on Washington and told a chef that he was sick and did not want to work. The chef told him to go home and come back the next day if he felt better.

On March 8, at about 4:00 p.m., Alesia Brown was picked up from the hospital by Earl Bedford. When they arrived at her apartment, which she shared with Ford, she unlocked the front door. When they arrived at the door that led to the apartment, they found out that the door was shattered from the frame. Upon entering the apartment, they observed Ford's body on the floor with a cord around her neck and a knife in her throat. They ran out and called the police.

After they returned to the front of the apartment building, people, including Brown, began to gather. Brown asked Alesia Brown what happened, and she replied that she found her roommate dead. Brown appeared surprised. Brown was interviewed by the police at the crime scene. Brown told the police that he moved out of the apartment building where the victim lived three weeks earlier, but that he still received mail there.

Brown alleged that he stopped by to pick up some mail at about 10:15 a.m. on March 7, and he heard Ford arguing with a Cuban man. Brown gave the police a description of the purported Cuban man. When Brown arrived home, he told his wife that Ford had been found dead. Initially, his wife was in disbelief. Later, Brown told her that he killed Ford. Brown's wife testified that Brown told her that he and Ford got into a fight over money and that Ford threatened to tell that they were having an affair.

After Ford left the apartment, Brown went inside and hid in the bathroom. After Ford returned and changed into her nightclothes, he came up behind her and wrapped a cord around her neck. According to Brown, they got into a scuffle over a knife, and he took the knife away from the victim and stabbed her in the neck with it. Brown then kicked in the door to make it look like someone broke into the apartment.

Brown was interviewed by the police on March 9, 22, and 26. Brown told his wife that he was tired of the police bothering him about Ford's murder. On March 28, 1985, Brown packed his clothes and left town. He told his wife to tell the police that he had been abducted by three men, dressed in black and carrying guns, in a red Pinto down the street. On April 1, 1985, Brown's wife told the police the above story when they came looking for Brown. On April 2, 1985, Brown's wife told them that the story about the abduction was not true and that she wanted to be a secret witness because she was afraid of Brown. She told the police that Brown told her that he killed Ford and told them how Brown killed Ford.

On April 24, 1985, Brown was arrested pursuant to a warrant, taken to the police station and was given his Miranda rights. Brown told them the abduction story. The police told him that they did not believe him because his wife had told them the truth.

About fifteen months later, on October 29, 1986, Brown confessed to the murder of Ford. Brown said that around 10:00 a.m. on March 7, 1985, he left home and headed for his place of work at the Grand Cafe. When he arrived at work he told the cook that he was not feeling well, and the cook told him that he could go home. Instead, Brown went to 3534 Washington. Brown went to the basement. He said that he saw Ford standing in the door way to her apartment and that Ford asked him what he was doing there. Brown replied, "I'm getting a pair of gloves."

According to Brown, as he walked up the stairs, she attacked him with a butcher knife. They began to tussle and ended up in the apartment. As Ford swung the knife at him, she accidentally stabbed herself in the chest. As he tried to leave, she removed the knife from her chest and attacked him the second time.

Then, he grabbed an electric curling iron, wrapped its cord around Ford's neck several times, and tied a knot in the cord. They wrestled, falling to the ground, and in their struggle the victim stabbed herself in the throat with the knife. He got up and left Ford's apartment. When he reached the top of the steps, he realized that he had left his keys inside Ford's apartment. Brown kicked in the door, went back inside Ford's apartment, got his keys, and then left.

The autopsy that was performed indicated that Ford died from strangulation. The autopsy also revealed that Ford was stabbed twice, once in the chest and once in the neck.

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Finally, the sentence in this case was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering the crime, the strength of the evidence and the defendant. This case is similar to other cases in which the death penalty was imposed. A sentence of death has often been imposed when the murder involved acts of brutality and abuse that showed depravity of mind. See, e.g., State v. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d 297, 310 (Mo. banc 1998).

Also, the Court has upheld death sentences where the defendants who were sentenced to death had prior murder convictions. See, e.g., State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 525 (Mo. banc 1994). The evidence of Brown's guilt is very strong. For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgments are affirmed.

Brown v. Luebbers, 344 F.3d 770 (8th Cir. 2003) (Habeas - Ford Murder).

After petitioner's conviction for first-degree murder and his death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his motion for state postconviction relief was denied, 998 S.W.2d 531, petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Jean C. Hamilton, J., denied petition. Petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals, Richard S. Arnold, held that: (1) claims that prosecutor made improper comment during closing argument, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object, were procedurally defaulted; (2) exclusion of portions of social worker's expert testimony did not violate due process; (3) appointment of defense counsel to represent petitioner in one murder prosecution did not constitute invocation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel for purposes of another murder; (4) petitioner's confession was not rendered involuntary because of his prior use of drugs; (5) counsel's actions in disclosing petitioner's conviction and death sentence for another murder was reasonable trial strategy; and (6) exclusion of letter written by petitioner's brother, during the sentencing phase, violated the Eighth Amendment and due process. Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. Bowman , Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Vernon Brown appeals from the decision of the District Court denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

In 1991, a jury convicted Brown of first-degree murder in the 1985 strangulation death of Synetta Ford in St. Louis, Missouri, and he was sentenced to be executed. His motion for state post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15 was overruled. That decision, as well as Brown's conviction and sentence, were affirmed in a consolidated appeal taken to the Missouri Supreme Court. State v. Brown, 998 S.W.2d 531(Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 979, 120 S.Ct. 431, 145 L.Ed.2d 337 (1999).

In 2000, Brown filed in the District Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising thirty-one grounds for relief. The District Court denied Brown's petition but granted a certificate of appealability on eleven grounds.

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he told them that he had seen Ford arguing with a Cuban man. After being questioned by police on three subsequent occasions, Brown left town on March 28, 1985, telling his wife, Kathy Moore, that he was tired of the questioning. He instructed Moore to tell police that he had been abducted at gunpoint by three men in a red Pinto. On April 1, Moore told that story to police when they came looking for him; on April 2, she told police that Brown had told her that he had killed Ford.

On April 24, 1985, Brown was arrested for Ford's murder and told police the abduction story. Soon after, Moore said she had lied to police about Brown telling her that he had committed the murder, so the charges against Brown were dropped.

On October 27, 1986, Brown was arrested for the murder of nine-year-old Janet Perkins, waived his right to have counsel present during questioning, and confessed. Prosecutors filed a complaint on October 28 charging him with the Perkins murder. Counsel from the public defender's office visited with Brown the next morning, sometime around 8:30 or 9:30, and found him to be indigent.

Later that morning, around 11:30, the officers who were investigating Synetta Ford's death visited Brown and read him his rights; Brown agreed to talk with them. During the course of the afternoon, after two additional Miranda [FN3] readings and two waivers of those rights, Brown made incriminating statements, eventually memorialized on videotape, telling this story: Brown struggled with Ford in her apartment when she came at him with a butcher knife.

According to Brown, Ford swung the knife wildly and stabbed herself in the chest. Then she removed the knife and attacked Brown again, at which time he wrapped the cord of an electric curling iron several times around her neck and knotted the cord. As the struggle continued, she stabbed herself again, this time in the throat, and Brown left.

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Having concluded that petitioner's murder trial was fatally flawed in the penalty phase, we reverse the order of the District Court and grant the writ of habeas corpus, requiring the State to reduce the penalty to life in prison, or to retry the issue of life or death. We leave the conviction undisturbed. It is so ordered.

Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458 (8th Cir. 2004) (Habeas - Ford Murder).

Background: The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Jean C. Hamilton, J., denied a habeas petition. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals, 344 F.3d 770, affirmed the District Court in part but granted the writ on one of petitioner's claims challenging his sentence.

Holdings: On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals, Bowman, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) Missouri Supreme Court adjudicated petitioner's federal constitutional claim on the merits, and therefore deferential Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) standard of review applied, and
(2) exclusion from penalty phase of murder trial of letter from petitioner's younger brother did not constitute a due process violation warranting habeas relief. Affirmed.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

In 1991, a jury convicted Vernon Brown in Missouri state court for the 1985 strangulation death of Synetta Ford. He was sentenced to death. His consolidated direct appeal and post-conviction challenges in the Missouri Supreme Court were unavailing. State v. Brown, 998 S.W.2d 531(Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 979, 120 S.Ct. 431, 145 L.Ed.2d 337 (1999). His 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in the District Court raising thirty-one grounds for relief was denied, but the court granted a certificate of appealability on eleven grounds. A panel of this Court affirmed the District Court in part but granted the writ on one of Brown's claims challenging his sentence. Brown v. Luebbers, 344 F.3d 770 (8th Cir.2003).

Both Brown and Allen D. Luebbers (representing the State) filed petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc. We requested from Brown a supplemental response addressing the appropriate standard of review to apply to the issue upon which the writ had been granted. After receiving the response, the panel denied both petitions for rehearing. The Court en banc rejected Brown's suggestions for reconsideration by the full Court but granted an en banc rehearing to the State.

The claim in question concerns a letter that Brown's defense counsel sought to have read into evidence during the penalty phase of Brown's trial for the Ford murder. Counsel represented to the trial court that the letter was from Darius Q. Turner, Brown's younger brother, and had been sent to Brown's counsel in the public defender's office.

According to the letter, Turner, a sergeant in the United States Army, was deployed in Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Shield at the time of Brown's sentencing. As a result, he was unable to be present in the courtroom to testify. In the letter, Turner noted the love and understanding between him and his brother and recounted how Brown had protected Turner from bigger boys when Turner was a child. As for their relationship as adults, Turner expressed regret for not staying in touch and told his brother that the telephone calls and letters from Brown meant more to him than those he received from others.

Finally, he implored those who might read the letter to let God's law decide Brown's fate. The trial court excluded the letter as hearsay. We now affirm the District Court's denial of relief on all grounds. In doing so, we adopt the holdings and reasoning of the panel opinion, except for Part VIII and the result.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996, a decision by a state court "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" is entitled to deference by the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). That is, we look only to see if such adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d)(1), (2). AEDPA effected a move toward greater deference in the § 2254 courts' review of state-court decisions. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (noting " § 2254(d)'s new, highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings").

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In any event, we are confident that the exclusion of the letter was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. "A constitutional error is harmless when 'it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." ' " Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, ----, 124 S.Ct. 7, 12, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2004) (citations to quoted cases omitted). As we have explained, the Turner letter's statements, to the extent they may be relevant, were cumulative to evidence as to Brown's character that was already before the jury.

Moreover, the evidence of aggravating circumstances was devastating. This is not a case, like Chambers, where the evidence in question was highly relevant to actual guilt or innocence. The Turner letter was not offered to prove that Brown was actually innocent, either of the crime or of the death penalty. Here, Brown received the constitutionally required "individualized consideration" before the death penalty was imposed. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (plurality opinion).

In these circumstances, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the letter would not have altered the jury's decision to impose the death penalty on Brown, and thus its exclusion was harmless error at most.

The judgment of the District Court denying the writ on any and all of Brown's claims is affirmed.